San Onofre's Unsafe Inspections Put SoCal At Risk

San Onofre Unit 2 Replacement Steam Generators Incomplete and Inadequate Tube Inspections

San Diego, CA (November 9, 2012) – The failure of eight Replacement Steam Generator (RSG) tubes (something which has never happened before) plus the structural integrity of thousands of additional damaged tubes in both SONGS Units 2 and 3 RSG’s are now in question and affect the safety of about 8 million Southern Californians.  This design failure, which has been termed by the NRC as “a very serious safety issue” because of the unprecedented tube damage: Unit 3 has 807 tubes plugged and Unit 2 has 510 tubes plugged – which makes them the 2 WORST RSG’s in the history of the entire U.S. Nuclear “Fleet”.  Which means that SCE was operating beyond their Current License Basis (CLB) and Safety Analysis Limits, plus SCE has yet to be penalized by the NRC for these violations, as required by law.  These RSG failures also offers real proof for the very first time, that if a Main Steam Line Break accident had occurred, at least eight RSG tubes would have leaked/ruptured and potentially caused the SONGS Unit 3 reactor to become a nuclear disaster (e.g., like Fukushima, Chernobyl or Three Mile Island) due to the loss of undetermined amount of radioactive core coolant! 

The truth is that San Onofre escaped becoming an International Nuclear Events Scale (INES) Level 7 nuclear disaster by the slightest of margins, unlike Fukushima!

SONGS Reactor Compatibility Experiment (RCE) States, “Visual inspection of the tube sheet primary side of the SG 3E088, with the secondary side pressurized, identified the tube with the leak.  Subsequent Eddy Current Testing (ECT) inspection identified extensive unexpected tube free-span
wear at the leakage location, not typically seen in recirculating SGs, and tube-to-support wear.  A full-length ECT inspection of each tube (100%) in all four SGs using a bobbin coil probe was performed and provided a comprehensive extent of condition evaluation for tube free-span and tube-to-support wear. The bobbin coil probe inspection was supplemented by Rotating Coil (+Point) probe inspection, which provided further confirmation of the extent of condition.  This supplemental rotating probe examination covered the U-bend portion of approximately 1300 tubes in each SG.”  Thousands of Unit 2 Steam generator tubes, Anti-vibration Bars and Tube support Plates have suffered extensive wear and undetermined amount of internal cracking during 22 months from flow-induced random vibrations and/or cyclic fatigue.  In addition, SCE has only performed remote visual inspection of 8% of the tubes in their damaged Unit 2 RSG’s plus this does include inspection of any tube support plates for any visible damage, structural deformation, cracks and/or any other abnormalities. 

The methods employed by SONGS using bobbin and rotating coil (+Point) probes to inspect the Unit 2 damaged tubes cannot reliably determine the depth, extent and location of these cracks, so the actual condition of the tubes remains a dangerous unknown!  In a Rush to Restart Unit 2 and cut their costs, Edison has not inspected more than 2000 Unit 2 Steam Generator tubes with T/R single-pass array probes, laser-scanned penetrant inspection and ultrasonic detection technologies to accurately identify and determine the depth, extent and location of these internal cracks at the U-bends and tube-support intersections.  NRC's regulations do not allow SONGS to start up with any steam generator tube cracked more than 35% of its wall thickness. Therefore by not performing these accurate inspections, Edison has not met the performance criteria specified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, “General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” Criterion 14, 15, 30 and 32, which establishes the fundamental regulatory requirements for the integrity of the SG tubes. 

The DAB Safety Team has concluded that SONGS Unit 2 Replacement Steam Generators (RSG) are in worse shape now than certified by SCE and their three NEI Qualified, “U.S. Nuclear Plant Designers.”  The accident scenario of concern consists of two events: (1) a non-isolable secondary system break or rupture that is outside containment; and (2) a coupling of this break with the rupture of, or significantly increased leakage from, affected SG tubes.  Even at 70% power operations, if a steam line break outside containment were to occur in Unit 2, the depressurization of the steam generators with the failure of a main steam isolation valve to close would result in 100% void fraction in the degraded U-Tube bundle and the straight leg portion between the Tube Support Plates.  This condition of ZERO Water in the steam generators would cause fluid elastic instability (FEI) and flow-induced random vibrations, which would then result in massive cascading SG tube failures, involving hundreds of degraded active SG tubes. Fluid elastic instability (FEI) and flow-induced random vibrations can progress through a buffer zone of plugged tubes to reach pressurized, in-service tubes and create additional SG tube failures.  The resulting SG secondary side blow-down could further increase tube leakage due to resonance vibrations within the affected SG tube bundle.  With an undetermined amount of simultaneous tube leaks/ruptures, approximately 60 tons of very hot high-pressure radioactive reactor coolant would leak into the secondary system.  The release of this amount of radioactive primary coolant, along with an additional approximately 200 tons of steam in the first five minutes from a broken steam line would EXCEED the SONGS NRC approved safety margins.  So, in essence, the RSG’s will become loaded guns, or a nuclear accident waiting to happen.  Any failure under these conditions, would allow significant amounts of radiation to escape to the atmosphere and a major nuclear accident would easily result causing much wider radiological consequences and even a potential nuclear meltdown of the reactor!  Since these events would happen at an extremely fast pace, no credit is assumed in the first 5 minutes of the main steam line break accident for: (1) Enhanced Unit 2 Defense-In-Depth Actions - SCE Restart Plan Enclosure 2, Item 9.0, and (2) The differential pressure across the SG tubes necessary to cause a rupture will not occur if operators prevent RCS re-pressurization in accordance with their Emergency Operating Procedures - Enhanced Unit 2 Defense-In-Depth Actions - SCE Restart Plan Enclosure 2, Item 5.2,2, Probabilistic Risk analysis.

In Emergency Planning Space, decisions have to be Accurate and Timely. Under-conservative, rushed and profit-motivated analyses based on limited facts, biased and ambiguous operational data, untested deterministic and probabilistic risk analysis, conflicting theories and differing operational assessments of degraded equipment at even reduced power operations for 150 days with conditional monitoring along with unproven and unreliable compensatory actions represent enormous risks to public safety, the environment and our nation’s economy. 

The NRC must REALLY resolve the concerns stated above as soon as possible. In the interim, the NRC must stop making favorable decisions to SCE (especially when it lacks defensible technical and inspection bases), which affect the lives of millions of Southern Californians."

The above analysis is consistent with the conclusions and reports provided earlier on this subject by:

1.     Fairewinds Associates Internationally Known Nuclear Consultant Arnie Gundersen and his team of Anonymous Industry insiders, who have had lengthy careers in the design, fabrication, and operation of nuclear steam generators.

2.     Professor Daniel Hirsch and Internationally Known Nuclear Consultant Dale Bridenbaugh.

3.     Dr. Joram Hopenfeld, a retired engineer from the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research and NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) report issued in February 2001, which substantiated many of Dr. Hopenfeld's concerns,

4.     David A. Lochbaum, Director of the Nuclear Safety Project for the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS).

CPUC: California Public Utilities Commission

DBA: Design Basis Accident

ECT: Eddy Current Testing

FEI: Fluid Elastic Instability

MHI: Mitsubishi Heavy Industry

MSLB: Main Steam Line Break

NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission

RCE: Reactor Compatibility Experiment

SCE: Southern California Edison

TTW: Tube-to-Tube Wear

DAB Safety Team

Media Contact: Don Leichtling (619) 296-9928 or Ace Hoffman (760) 720-7261

Don Leichtling and Ace Hoffman are the spokesmen of the DAB Safety Team, who along with the support of an ever-growing number of SONGS Concerned Insiders and Whistleblowers have prepared the following analysis.

________________________________________________________________________

Copyright November 9, 2012 by The DAB Safety Team. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast or redistributed without crediting the DAB Safety Team. The contents cannot be altered without the Written Permission of the DAB Safety Team Leader and or the DAB Safety Team’s Attorneys.

Will the NRC give SCE what it wants, permission to restart unit 2?

Will the NRC give SCE what it wants, permission to restart?

A PUBLIC MEETING NOTICE: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station DOCKET: 05000361/362 November 16th, 2012 6:00 p.m. – 9:00 p.m. (PDT) LOCATION: Doubletree Guest Suites, Doheny Beach, CA 34402 Pacific Coast Highway Dana Point, CA 92629.

The 8.4 million citizens in the 50 radius of San Onofre should be very worried about the Southern California Edison's plan to restart unit number two at SONGS. SCE will explain in detail their plan of action to restart unit #2 at this meeting. For your information and safety please attend this meeting. Will the NRC give SCE want it wants, which is permission for them to restart without making any repairs to unit #2, with only the addition of a sound listening device to hear if there is a new steam leak?

The NRC has not replied to the public demand for an adjudicated public hearing that was clearly heard and understood by Mr. Collins at the last NRC meeting on San Onofre on October 9, 2012. How long will the public have to wait for an answer? Time is running out, and the NRC's credibility is once again in question. Just what are the NRC alliances? Why is there such a rush to restart this defective steam generator? 

Will the NRC ever respond to the questions submitted by David Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists?  These question where:

Union of Concerned Scientists has serious concerns about Southern California Edison’s (SCE) restart plans for San Onofre Unit 2. In a 10/12/2012 letter submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), David Lochbaum, Director, Nuclear Safety Project, identified the following issues:

1.      Unit 2 replacement steam generator 2SG89 has significantly more wear indications per number of supports than does [Unit 2] replacement steam generator 2SG88. Until the reason for this marked difference between the wear degradation for the Unit 2 replacement steam generators is understood, the operational assessment performed for future operation is suspect. [See graph in Lochbaum letter].

2.      Since all four replacement steam generators came from the same manufacturer, were of the same design, made of the same materials, assembled using the same procedures, and operated under nearly identical conditions in twin reactors, the reason for this marked difference is unclear… [the] explanation is not well documented and therefore appears to be more convenient than factual.

3.      The document states that the owner will “administratively limit Unit 2 to 70% reactor power prior to a mid-cycle” outage to inspect the replacement steam generators. What are the legal consequences if the reactor power were to increase to 75%, 85% or 100% power? The NRC has licensed San Onofre Unit 2 to operate at 100% power. What would legally prevent the owner from restarting Unit 2 and increasing its output to the NRC licensed limit? The NRC’s enforcement program includes sanctions when its regulations are violated, but nothing for broken promises. If the NRC agrees that reactor operation at less than 100 percent power is warranted, it should enforce that reduction with an order or comparable legally-enforceable document.

4.      Table 8-1 of Enclosure 2 and its accompanying text attempt to explain how operating Unit 2 at 70% power will prevent the tube-to-tube wear (TTW) experienced on Unit 3 by comparing it to an anonymous reactor (called Plant A). ..reliance on one suspect data point (Plant A) is hardly solid justification for operation and 70% power being acceptable.

5.      There is no justification in this 80-plus page document for an operating duration of 150 days.

6.      … there are no legal means compelling the plant’s owner to shut down Unit 2 after 150 days of operation at or above 15% power.

7.      ...a temporary nitrogen-16 radiation detection system will be installed prior to the Unit 2 startup. However, there is no commitment to use it after startup, or to keep it in service should it stop functioning. The detection system is proposed as a defense-in-depth measure, but there is no assurance it will be operated.

8.      Attachment 6 to Enclosure 2 has proprietary information redacted. Section 1.4 of Enclosure 2 states that the owner used AREVA, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, and Intertek/APTECH to review the operational assessment. At least one of these companies manufactures replacement steam generators and would therefore be a competitor to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), which made the replacement steam generators for San Onofre. If the owner did not withhold the proprietary information from MHI’s competitors, why withhold it at all? If SCE did withhold the proprietary information from these reviewers, what is the value of their independent, but limited, review?

The question has to be asked should the restart be put on hold until the Academy of Science cancer study is completed, and should real time radiation monitoring be put in place on NRC's or SCE's website prior to a restart? The public needs to see for themselves what is being released when this defective steam generator blows again.

It is clear to ROSE that the rush to restart unit two is on, and the decision by the NRC to let SCE move forward has been made at the highest levels of the NRC.

One last question remains will you stand up for the public’s right to know and for the safety our children deserve?

Gene Stone, ROSE

http://residentsorganizedforasafeenvironment.wordpress.com/

Why San Onofre Needs To Be Shut Down

MUST WATCH FOR ANYONE LIVING IN THE ZONE!!! 

Both nuclear power reactors numbers 2 and 3 at San Onofre, California have been shut downsince January 2012 because of faulty, leaking new steam generators.

Operated by Southern California Edison, the San Onofre nuclear reactors are located near earthquake faults in a tsunami zone.

Despite growing opposition by national and local organizations, the operators are pushing to restart one of the reactors without a license amendment and full evidentiary hearing before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

Dan Hirsch, President of The Committee to Bridge the Gap, recently issued a report detailing the dangers to public safety that restarting the damaged nuclear reactor would pose.

This is his presentation of the Report's findings. The Hirsch Report - Pt. 1

San Onofre ALMOST Caused A Nuclear Disaster

PRESS RELEASE

DAB Safety Team   November 02, 2012

Media Contact: Don Leichtling (619) 260-0160 or Ace Hoffman (760) 720-7261

FOR  IMMEDIATE  RELEASE 

Fluid Elastic Instability (FEI) is a phenomenon that can occur in poorly designed Steam Generators (SG’s) due to very 'dry' steam (low moisture content, aka high steam void fractions) causing the SG tubes to vibrate vigorously along their length (called the in-plane direction) until they hit their neighboring tubes due to tight clearances.  These forces can cause tube-to-tube ruptures, while the tight clearances between the tubes can be attributed to operating, poor design and or even manufacturing defects.  

At the end of January 2012, a radioactive leak in SONGS RSG Unit 3, resulted in an emergency shut down, the cause of which was later determined to have been fluid elastic instability (FEI >1) caused by higher vapor fractions (~99.6 %).  Later 8 tubes failed their “in-situ” pressure testing and leaked with a flow > 0.5 gallons per minute at Main Steam Line Break Testing Conditions which resulted in more than 800 additional tubes having to be plugged; which is something that has never happened before in the USA.  It is important to note that SCE’s poorly designed RSG’s now have more damaged and or plugged tubes than all the rest of the US reactor fleet put together and that is with only 7% of the tubes in Unit 3 and 8% of the tubes in Unit 2 having been visually inspected to date!

Imagine what would have happened if something like an “ordinary” Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) occurred where the void fractions would have reached 100% causing the vibration amplitude to increase exponentially, which would then cause hundreds of tubes to leak and or rupture, which would have then over-pressurized the steam generators, lifted the main steam safety valves and released 60 tons of radioactive coolant and steam into the Southern California environment within a matter of minutes. This would have caused a Fukushima Type of Nuclear Reactor Meltdown in SONGS Unit 3 Reactor, so Southern Californians were very lucky this time (See all the DAB Safety Team Papers.).

The truth is that San Onofre escaped becoming an International Nuclear Events Scale (INES) Level 7 nuclear disaster by the slightest of margins, unlike Fukushima!

The DAB Safety Team assisted by several SONGS Anonymous Insiders has concluded that SONGS Unit 2 Replacement Steam Generators (RSG’s) are in worse shape now than certified by the SCE and their three NEI Qualified, “U.S. Nuclear Plant Designers.”  Even at 70% power operations, if a steam line break outside containment were to occur in Unit 2, the depressurization of the steam generators with the failure of a main steam isolation valve to close, it would result in 100% void fraction in the degraded U-Tube bundle and the “straight leg portion” between the Tube Support Plates.  This condition of ZERO Water in the steam generators would cause fluid elastic instability (FEI) and flow-induced random vibrations, which would then result in massive cascading SG tube failures, involving hundreds of degraded active SG tubes, along with all the damaged inactive (all the plugged /stabilized) SG tubes.  With an undetermined amount of simultaneous tube leaks/ruptures, approximately 60 tons of very hot high-pressure radioactive reactor coolant would leak into the secondary system.  The release of this amount of radioactive primary coolant, along with an additional approximately 200 tons of steam in the first five minutes from a broken steam line would EXCEED the SONGS NRC approved safety margins.  So, in essence, the RSG’s will become loaded guns, or a nuclear accident waiting to happen.  Any failure under these conditions, would allow significant amounts of radiation to escape to the atmosphere and a major nuclear accident would easily result causing much wider radiological consequences and even a potential nuclear meltdown of the reactor!  Since these events would happen at an extremely fast pace, no credit is assumed in the first 5 minutes of the main steam line break accident for: (1) Enhanced Unit 2 Defense-In-Depth Actions - SCE Restart Plan Enclosure 2, Item 9.0, and (2) The differential pressure across the SG tubes necessary to cause a rupture will not occur if operators prevent RCS re-pressurization in accordance with their Emergency Operating - Enhanced Unit 2 Defense-In-Depth Actions - SCE Restart Plan Enclosure 2, Item 5.2,2, Probabilistic Risk analysis.

The above statement is consistent with the conclusions and reports provided earlier on this subject by:

1.     Fairewinds Associates Internationally Known Nuclear Consultant Arnie Gundersen and his team of Anonymous Industry insiders, who have had lengthy careers in steam generator design, fabrication, and operation.

2.     Professor Daniel Hirsch and Internationally Known Nuclear Consultant Dale Bridenbaugh.

3.     Dr. Joram Hopenfeld, a retired engineer from the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research and NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) report issued in February 2001, which substantiated many of Dr. Hopenfeld's concerns,

4.     David A. Lochbaum, Director of the Nuclear Safety Project for the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS).

The Operational Assessments reports prepared by AREVA, and Westinghouse “conflict and contradict” * with MHI’s Technical Report and Press Statements, on the causes and extent of degradation pertaining to the SONGS Unit 2 Steam Generator Replacement Generators.  The DAB Safety Team Expert Panel and SONGS Concerned Insiders opinion is that these reports are not comprehensive and fail to arrive at a concise and clear conclusion, because:

(1)  SCE Engineers have either not provided, or they are withholding all the information to these parties because of  “The consequences of being Wrong, Terminated or Fired”,

(2)  Due to competing and proprietary interests between the three NEI qualified, “US Nuclear Plant Designers”, these reports have not been openly and candidly discussed,

(3)  Time/Pressure exerted by SCE on these parties to prepare Operational Assessments in order to rush to Restart Unit 2 have led to incomplete conclusions,

(4)  Since nobody really knows, what really happened, all the Parties have a shared interest to “Operate Unit 2 at reduced power as a  “Test Lab to conduct Nuclear Experiments “ to determine, “What really went wrong with unit 3, so SCE can determine the Root Cause, corrective actions, repair and test plans to return both units 2 and 3 to full power operations.”

*NOTES: Just some examples of the conflicting and contradicting statements are shown below:

1. Independent Expert 1 states, “U-tube out-of-plane direction is more susceptible to flow-induced excitation than the in-plane direction due to lower U-bend natural frequency in the out-of-plane direction. U-tube FEI in the in-plane direction has never been observed in the U-tube SGs before its occurrence in the SONGS SGs. However, recent academic studies report (2005) that FEI may also occur in the in-plane direction, if tube motion in the in-plane direction is possible (no tube in-plane supports or low tube contact forces with the out-of-plane supports). “

2. Independent Expert 2 states, “Out-of-plane fluid-elastic instability has been observed in nuclear steam generators in the past and has led to tube bursts at normal operating conditions. However, the observation of in-plane fluid-elastic instability in steam generators in a nuclear power plant is a true paradigm shift.”

DAB Safety Team Comment to items 1 & 2: FEI in the in-plane direction has been identified as early as 1983 by Academic Scholars and Palo Verde Replacement Steam Generator manufactured in the early 2000s are designed for FEI. Weaver and Schneider in 1983 examined the flow induced response of heat exchanger U-tubes with flat bar supports. It is worth quoting the first conclusion of their paper: “The effect of flat bar supports with small clearance is to act as apparent nodal points for flow-induced tube response. They not only prevented the out-of-plane mode as expected but also the in-plane modes. No in-plane instabilities were observed, even when the flow velocity was increased to three times that expected to cause instability in the apparently unsupported first in-plane mode.”

3. Independent Expert 1 states, “ECT-based AVB locations are compared with design-based locations. It is evaluated that AVB insertion depth in actual SG is not changed compared with the design-based location. There is some Pattern-1 wear identified by visual inspection, for which Bobbin ECT was not able to detect as this type of wear.”

4. Independent Expert 2 states, "It should be noted that because of field spread effects the bobbin probe typically overestimates wear scar lengths." Even though no evidence of elongated wear scars is evident in Unit 2, it doesn’t necessarily rule out undetected in-plane instability. Wear scars at AVB locations may be too shallow to evaluate properly and AVB wear scar lengths may be shortened by a contact length that is small because of the presence of AVB twist. The best evidence of in-plane instability is the detection of TTW, not the detection of elongated AVB wear scars. Extensive inspections of the regions of interest with the +Pt™ probe show that possible undetected TTW would be less than 5 %TW. It is unreasonable to expect detectable elongation of AVB wear scars without the detection of TTW. The significance of elongated AVB wear scars is that the amount of elongation reveals the extent of unstable tube motion in-plane.

5. Independent Expert 3 states that he does not have access to the assembly procedures. The 0.12 to 0.14 dimensions are anecdotal (based on personal observation, case study reports, or random investigations rather than systematic scientific evaluation) without verification.

DAB Safety Team Comments to items 3 & 4 & 5: Will be provided later…

Copyright November 02, 2012 by The DAB Safety Team. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast or redistributed without crediting the DAB Safety Team. The contents cannot be altered without the Written Permission of the DAB Safety Team Leader and or the DAB Safety Team’s Attorneys.

AVB: Anti Vibration Bar

CPUC: California Public Utilities Commission

DBA: Design Basis Accident

ECT: Eddy Current Testing

FEI: Fluid Elastic Instability

MHI: Mitsubishi Heavy Industry

MSLB: Main Steam Line Break

NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SCE: Southern California Edison

TTW: Tube-to-Tube Wear

Fast, Pray, & Walk for a Nuclear Free Future

Fast, Pray, & Walk for a Nuclear Free Future and Respect for Mother Earth

Posted on November 2, 2012 by residentsorganizedforasafeenvironment

Fast, Pray, & Walk for a Nuclear Free Future and Respect for Mother Earth, putting your Prayers into Action.
祈り prayer 徒歩 walk 断食 fasting アクション action

11/30 Walk to San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station from Dana Point, fasting & prayer starts Dec 1-7.

After Hiroshima, Chernobyl and Fukushima, our world is crying. We may see a tear on the Buddha’s face and sense that Jesus and our ancestors also weep. We will fast (& walk) with hope and prayer for peace and nuclear free world.

We have a duty to pass on to the next generation a safe, clean, peaceful future and the possibility of happiness. But we face great challenges to survive on Mother Earth with the increased spread of radiation and the continuing possibility of nuclear war.

All life is born and sustained from the same source. We are one, irrespective of nationality, race, gender, or age. We can strive to live peacefully and to love one another. In this spirit, we are going to fast and pray at San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant during the first week of December. (Dec. 8th is the Buddha’s Enlightenment day.) Afterwards we also will walk and pray in LA and San Luis Obispo. This is an interfaith activity and open to everybody. It will offer the opportunity to learn more about the great wisdom of Buddha, Jesus, Mohammad and the spirits of our ancestors. Kanaeda, Senji

The walk will start in Dana Point, CA on November 30 at 9 A.M. from the harbor parking lot and walk the 12 miles to San Onofre Nuclear power plant. This is estimated to take 3 to 4 hrs. Please join us for all or part of the walk, remember to bring water. If you cannot walk with us please plan to join us at San Onofre state park at the arrival time at 2 P.M. for the start of the prayers and ceremonies.

The name of our Japanese Buddhist order is “Nipponzan Myohoji”. We follow especially “Lotus Sutra” among various kinds of Buddha’s teachings. That is similar to “All life is sacred or all my relations” what Native people pray for. When we walk and pray outside we always chant our sacred word “NA MU MYO HO REN GE KYO” with beating of the scared drum.

Tentative Plan:
11/30 Fri. Walk to or around San Onofre (TBA)
12/1 Sat. Rohachi Fasting 1st Day 7am-5pm (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station)
2 Sun. 2nd Day 7am-5pm
3 Mon. 3rd Day 7am-5pm
4 Tue. Breaking Fast (4th Day)
5 Thu. 5th Day 7am-5pm
6 Fri. 6th Day 7am-5pm
7 Sat. Breaking Fast(7th Day)
8 Sun. Jodo-e Celebration (Buddha’s Enlightened Day) Move to LA
9 Mon. Rest Day
10 Tue. Peace Walk in LA
11 Wed. Move to San Luis Obispo
12 Thu. Walk from San Luis Obispo/Morrow Bay to Diablo Canyon

For more info contact: We are looking for a few volunteers if you would like to help.
Carol Jahnkow, caroljahnkow@gmail.com Peace Resource Center of S.D. Ca. www.prcsd.org
Gene Stone, genston@sbcglobal.net ROSE http://residentsorganizedforasafeenvironment.wordpress.com/