Showing posts with label Nuclear decommissioning. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nuclear decommissioning. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 10, 2014

What’s up with the #SCECEP

SCECEP meetingIn my opinion, I’m very concerned about the way the SCE/CEP was set up and the direction the leadership of SCE/CEP is now taking us. Instead of taking the neutral position and uncovering and observing the evidence as presented they consistently and obviously put a positive spin on it. Everything is fine and SCE is doing the best job possible.
  1. We must ask ourselves does this repeated positive spin serve the public interest? In my opinion No.
  2. Is this Community Engagement Panel doing the best job possible to protect the safety of our communities and California? In my opinion we are not.
  3. Can or will the SCE/CEP make the changes necessary in its charter to become an effective and strong safety advocate for the decommissioning and safe storage of nuclear waste at San Onofre that the people of California deserve until such time as the DOE takes possession of this long-term problem? In my opinion that is still up in the air.
To this point SCE’s attempt to be inclusive and transparent clearly has it’s limits. While asking me and others to bring up the safety concerns of the local citizens, SCE and the SCE/CEP leadership has then glossed over them, seeing these concerns only to be checked off their list one by one. Example; Tim Brown told the CA Senate Energy, Utilities and Communications Committee on Aug 12, 2014 that local concerns have be heard and addressed. Implying some sort of conclusion or satisfaction by all with SCE’s predestined decommissioning plan. Link for Senate hearing http://youtu.be/_q6YulhHpcU?t=1h2m9s starting time for Tim Brown 1:02:10 to 1:17:45. Nothing of course could be further from the truth for many in our local communities. SCE, Inclusiveness is not just a tool to be used on the “Yellow Brick Road to decommissioning”, we are not in the Land of Oz after all. We are however in the backyards of over 8.4 million Californians.   SCE and its CEP leadership now have a consistent record of spinning information to fit the SCE agenda. For example, regarding “defense in depth”, the chairman, after being concerned at first at the lack of defense in depth for dry cask long-term storage, concluded after his ‘”careful research”, that citizen activists had not asked about ” defense in depth” for waste storage before and that the nuclear industry and the NRC has done a poor job in defining  and getting the word out about “defense in depth” for nuclear waste and dry cask storage. Citing “defense in depth” as cladding on fuel rods, ceramics on the fuel pellets , even the 5/8″ thickness of the canister itself and concrete overpack of the casks as if these were “defense in depth” that were unspoken of in the past. And he was right they were not spoken of in the past as “defense in depth” because they were not considered nor should we consider them today as “defense in depth”. While these have some small measure of defense, they are not in anyway sufficient or adequate for long-term storage of nuclear waste within a heavily populated area like Southern California, and everyone in this nuclear industry knows the calculated risk they are betting on with California’s future.
David Victor’s report Safety of Long-term storage in casks: Issues For San Onofre Dec 9, 2014 does have some items we do agree on:  “It  is  likely  that  spent  fuel  will  be  stored  in  dry  casks  at  the  San  Onofre  nuclear   site  for  very  long  periods  of  time—most  likely  well  beyond  the  20-­‐year  period  for   initial  licensing  of  the  casks.” page 2 of report. “Some  elements  of  what  will  be  needed  for  “defense  in  depth”  are  not  yet  fully   in  existence—for  example,  actual  equipment  that  would  allow  removal  of  fuel  from   a  cask  without  an  onsite  pool  has  been  designed  and  a  prototype  was  demonstrated   in  the  1990s,  but  no  such  full  scale  commercial  system  currently  exists.  Similarly,   full-­‐blown  procedures  for  repairing  all  forms  of  cask  cracking  are  not  yet  fully   certified” page 4 of report. Other than these items there is not much here other than “pro nuclear industry spin.” Read full report at:https://docs.google.com/document/d/13DurWxC8l3l_VCNEGXz5bg0V4FJteepR7LVuUjPz4Xk/edit?usp=sharing


Thursday, May 22, 2014

San Onofre Priorities: On-Site Safety, Off-Site Storage

San Onofre Priorities: On-Site Safety, Off-Site Storage
June 7 marks the first anniversary of Southern California Edison’s decision to permanently close the troubled San Onofre nuclear plant near San Clemente. Gene Stone of Residents Organized for a Safe Environment (ROSE) summed it up this way: “We are safer – but we are not yet safe.”
There are two crucial matters: the quality of storage technology on-site at San Onofre, and the prospects for long-term storage at a remote site.
The accuracy of Stone’s words was confirmed at a May 6 workshop on managing nuclear fuel waste. Tom Palmisano, senior nuclear officer for Edison, reported that cooling pools at San Onofre currently hold 2668 spent fuel assemblies including 1115 “high burn-up,” a fuel type that is hotter both thermally and radioactively than conventional fuel.
Spent fuel from Unit 1 is already in dry casks holding 24 assemblies each. Removal of Unit 2 and Unit 3 fuel from pools will require 100 more 32-unit casks. This will triple the footprint of the concrete storage structure, from today’s 200 x 400 feet to an ultimate 400 x 600 feet.
Experts are unanimous that fuel pool hazards are far greater than dry cask storage and the intent is to complete transfer in 5 to 7 years. At that point the focus shifts to long-term safety of casks.
A lively debate at the May 6 workshop pitted Marvin Resnikoff of Radioactive Waste Management Associates against Michael McMahon from cask manufacturer AREVA and Drew Barto, lead on spent fuel storage and transportation for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
Resnikoff reviewed the performance hazards and risks in cask safety for long-term on-site storage and off-site transport. McMahon and Barto countered with advances in design technology that they say provide a robust and secure storage system even for high burn-up fuel. Through this exchange of sharply differing views, the workshop added value by throwing the spotlight on key technical issues in specific ways that can be debated to a point of resolution. Nuclear safety advocates will be watching the outcome closely.
The other major contribution of the workshop was to confirm a striking degree of unanimity regarding the need to revitalize the process for locating and developing sites for long-term remote storage. Gains in on-site safety promised by technology advances did not diminish the consensus that spent fuel waste should be removed from San Onofre at the earlier possible opportunity.
In part this reflects the unusually exposed nature of the San Onofre site. But sentiment runs deeper. Per Peterson, a member of the NRC’s Blue Ribbon Commission, expressed a feeling little short of dismay at the national failure to identify and develop remote storage. Edison said it is committed to this outcome as the fully satisfactory solution. Members of the expert panel as well as the Citizens Engagement Panel (CEP) that hosted the event made it clear that indefinite on-site storage remains unacceptable.
Message to the NRC: San Onofre may be the test case where all parties are urging a better way than the grotesque and inappropriate land-use outcome of constructing a nuclear waste mausoleum at San Onofre or at any other closed nuclear plant.
Dr. David Victor of UC San Diego chairs the CEP, which organized the workshop. He summed up the discussion this way: “We have an obligation to make the long-term storage of fuel as safe as possible and practical. We need a strategy for federal action on consolidated storage and ultimate repositories. Toward that end, we should articulate what we as a community need—and carry through with the Governor and Congress to assure they give priority to what is most important.”
Enter Senator Barbara Boxer and colleagues Sanders and Markey. On May 16 they introduced Senate bills S. 2324, 2325 and 2326, which would:
• Require the NRC to cease its current practice of issuing exemptions to emergency response and security requirements for spent fuel at closed nuclear reactors, unless all fuel storage at the site is in dry casks.
• Ensure that host states and communities have a meaningful role in shaping decommissioning plans for retired nuclear plants.
• Require for the first time that the NRC to explicitly and publicly approve or reject each proposed decommissioning plan.
• Ensure operator compliance with the NRC requirement that spent nuclear fuel be removed from pools and placed into dry cask storage within 7 years after the decommissioning plan is submitted to the NRC.
• Provide funding to help reactor licensees implement plans for decommissioning nuclear plants.
• Expand the emergency planning zone for non-compliant reactor operators to 50 miles.
The Boxer-Sanders-Markey bills are classic legislative oversight. They close safety-related loopholes and provide a more accountable and participatory process for affected area residents.
These sensible steps do not in themselves deal with on-site storage design technology or remote site development. But they are in the spirit of comprehensive nuclear waste management, which remains one of America’s largest environmental challenges.
By Gleen Pascall
Sierra Club

Tuesday, May 6, 2014

Issues involving Storage and Transportation of High Burnup Nuclear Fuel

Issues involving Storage and Transportation of High Burnup Nuclear Fuel

By
Marvin Resnikoff, Ph.D.
SCE Community Engagement Panel (CEP)
San Juan Capistrano Community Center
May 6, 2014
In the interests of full disclosure, I once worked for a public interest organization with the trademarked name, CEP, Council on Economic Priorities, and co-authored a book in 1983 on transportation issues, 3 years before Holtec, who supplies dry storage casks for the nuclear industry. The CEP book supported dry storage of nuclear fuel, but I never realized at the time the present situation, the amount of fuel and burnup that the industry would employ. In a way, part of the problem is my doing. As a member of the Sierra Club, we intervened against the only commercial reprocessing operation in the United States, Nuclear Fuel Services in West Valley, NY, and shut them down. The lack of reprocessing has led utilities to store more fuel in storage pools and in dry storage casks. The lack of a final repository is also partly my doing. I work for the State of Nevada as a consultant on nuclear transportation issues and have since 1986. My parents never gave me a middle name, but sometimes I think it’s “Trouble.”
So utilities are left with the problem of spent nuclear fuel and also faced with competition from natural gas. The economics has forced utilities to hold fuel in reactors longer, not 3 years, but 4 ½, which means less shutdown time. And the economics are also forcing the industry to put more fuel into each dry storage cask, moving from 24 PWR assemblies, to 32, which Transnuclear has requested for San Onofre, to 37 PWR assemblies, which Holtec has requested. I’m going to briefly discuss transportation and storage of nuclear fuel, and I’m going to focus on high burnup nuclear fuel (HBF). What and why is HBF? NRC has not fully investigated the technical issues and implications, which in my view, are major and should have required careful study and an EIS. This is work that should have been done before the NRC allowed utilities to go to high burnup, not after. By high burnup, I mean fuel greater than 45 GWD/MTU, but in clearer terms, allowing each assembly to remain in the reactor longer. The implications are the radioactive inventory in HBF is greater. NRC staff have focused on the heat in HBF, which is greater. But heat will decline over time. One implication is decommissioning will take longer. Fuel will sit in fuel pool for 20 years or more. San Onofre has high burnup fuel. The implication of a longer decay time is that the workers at the site will not be available for the decom process. Putting more fuel into the same space, moving from 24 fuel assemblies to 32, as Southern California Edison intends to do, will further the cooling off period. However, while heat is an important consideration, but perhaps of greater import is the impact on fuel cladding. It may surprise you to know that the NRC does not know how much HBF exists across the country. While the NRC has the power and the ability to identify how much HBF is at each reactor. The NRC has inspectors at each reactor. They simply have not made the effort. The Department of Energy (DOE) is conducting a survey which should be released in September. HBF has major implications for decommissioning, storage, transportation and disposal.
Storage Issues
Let’s step back a second. Nuclear fuel assembly – collection of fuel rods. (fuel assembly) Each rod, about 12 feet long is composed of a tube, cladding, with nuclear fuel stacked like poker chips inside. But the cladding is quite thin, not much thicker than heavy duty aluminum foil. During operation and after, the cladding will develop defects. Studies by Argonne show that the zirconium cladding of HBF will become less ductile, or more brittle. How brittle? The NRC has contracted with Oak Ridge to examine cladding of HBF. The Oak Ridge study should have been completed in March, but has not been released. I call on the NRC to release the Oak Ridge study, before it is manicured by public relations specialists. This is a study that should have been done before HBF was licensed, not after the fact. In response the NRC would say, we do have technical support. The NRC will cite a study at Turkey Point reactor. But this demonstration project examined a cask loaded with lower burnup fuel (approximately 30 GWd/MTU average). Following 15 years of storage, the cask internals and fuel did not show any significant degradation (Einziger et al., 2003). According to that report, the data from this study can be extrapolated to maintain a licensing safety finding that low burnup SNF can be safely stored in a dry storage mode for at least 80 years with an appropriate aging management program that considers the effects of aging on systems, structures, and components (SSCs). The limits in ISG-11, Rev. 3, a peak cladding temperature of 400 oC, are all based on data available prior to 2002. None of this is directly relevant to HBF.
The NRC will also cite the 1988 report, PNL-6258, “Assessment of the Use of Extended Burnup Fuel in Light Water Power Reactors,” but this report did not address the cladding problems of HBF.
Cooling during storage may result in hydride-induced embrittlement. According to a more recent Argonne report, “pre-storage drying-transfer operations and early stage storage subject cladding to higher temperatures and much higher pressure-induced tensile stresses than experienced in-reactor or during pool storage.” The Argonne report discussed the problems of embrittlement of cladding of HBF. Due to thinning of cladding and lack of ductility, the cladding is weakened. As a result the cladding may not be an effective barrier to release of radioactivity to the cask canister. A report by the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board goes into the matter in great detail. Thinning of cladding is correlated with the outer oxide layer on the cladding. As seen in the figure below, at a burnup of 60 GWD/MTU, the outer oxide layer is 115 microns. Considering the initial cladding thickness is on average 600 microns, NWTRB calculates a metal loss on the order of 70 microns or 12% at 60 GWD/MTU. Together with a hydride layer inside the cladding, this represents substantial weakening of the cladding.
Moving closer to home, for this reason, we are of the opinion, Edison should consider the HBF fuel assemblies to be damaged fuel that should be individually canned; the canned assemblies would then be stored in a HUHOMS concrete containment (NUHOMS being inserted) or a Holtec vertical silo (Holtec silo) for an indefinite period.
Passive cooling works like a chimney. Once fuel is removed and put into storage, after 18 to 20 years, the NRC license can be converted to storage. Here is what remains of CT Yankee reactor (photo). Nuclear fuel in 40 Holtec casks, and reactor internals in 3 casks. San Onofre will have many more casks. But one additional feature distinguishes the San Onofre situation, the salt environment. Documents show that the stainless steel canister has pitting corrosion, after less than 20 years. This is a major concern if casks are going to remain on-site for an extended period, say 40 to 100 years. NRC’s NUREG/CR-7030 states that atmospheric corrosion of sea salt can lead to stress corrosion cracking within 32 and 128 weeks in austenitic [corrosion resistant] stainless steel canisters. How will this corrosion be prevented? Can the canisters be coated to prevent corrosion We do not believe the industry has the experience in transferring failed (damaged) fuel from one cask to another and no procedures for doing this. In fact, no spent fuel bundle, damaged or not, has ever been transferred from one dry cask to another. Since high burnup fuel is more likely to fail sooner in storage, this becomes an even bigger and more urgent problem.
This is not a theoretical problem. Three examples of stress corrosion cracking at San Onofre have already been seen. In the fall of 2009, three examples of chloride-induced SCC which extended through-wall were discovered at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) in the weld heat-affected zone (HAZ) of Type 304 stainless steel piping. The piping included 24-inch, Schedule 10 emergency core cooling system (ECCS) suction piping; 6-inch, Schedule 10 alternate boration gravity feed to charging line piping; and an ECCS mini flow return to refueling water storage tank. While the through-wall failures were attributed to chloride-induced SCC, surface pitting was also observed on the surface of the pipes, with a greater concentration in the weld HAZ. All three pipes were exposed to the outside ambient marine atmosphere. Through-wall cracks developed after an estimated 25 years of service….
These are my takeaways on the HBF and storage issue:
• Little technical support for NRC approval of high burnup fuel (HBF). Experiment taking place in the field.
• Total amount of HBF unknown. At a minimum, the NRC should survey utilities.
• HBF will postpone storage up to 20 years; 32 PWR canister extends cooldown period.
• Cladding defects are a major problem for HBF; HBF may not be retrievable. HBF should be canned.
• Because of corrosion, long-term storage may not be possible in a salt environment.
Transportation Issues
Brittleness is important when considering transportation and disposal. One utility, Maine Yankee, has taken the important step of canning the HBF, that is, individually enclosing each fuel assembly in a stainless steel container. Concern is vibrations when transported, and potential shattering of cladding in a transportation accident. Transportation casks must satisfy regulatory accidents. Casks must withstand 30 foot drop onto an unyielding surface. In a hypothetical transportation accident, cask must withstand an end drop (drop from Holtec rpt) where 140 ton casks are cushioned by impact limiters. But a more serious accident involves a side impact where impact limiters are not present. One example is a RR crossing where a cask could be struck by the sill of a locomotive. (picture from NV rpt). NRC has not carefully evaluated such an accident, including the impact limiters. NRC hypothetical accident requires the cask to withstand a 30 inch drop onto a punch.
Another type of accident involves fire. Several major train fires have occurred recently. 140 ton casks would be shipped by train, on the same routes used by oil tankers. Right now, nuclear fuel has nowhere to go, no final repository. But NRC has not done the statistical analysis to determine the statistical likelihood of a nuclear shipment caught in an oil tanker fire. A study of the likelihood of an accident involving an oil tanker fire and a nuclear shipment requires a sophisticated Monte Carlo analysis. In addition to the likelihood of a long duration fire involving a nuclear cask, the NRC must also analyze the consequences of a radioactive release In my opinion, the NRC has not properly taken into account a long duration fire, by not properly taking into account the conduction of fire heat into the cask interior. As seen, fuel sits within a sealed canister, welded shut. The transportation overpack is metal, but this is surrounded by a neutron absorber, generally boronated, hydrogenated plastic, with an outer metal envelope. (picture of cask crossection). Plastic does not effectively conduct heat, so additional metal pieces serve to transfer heat out of the cask, but also conduct heat into the cask in a fire. Oil fire may burn at 1850 oF or higher depending on the air supply. The hypothetical accident fire consists of an all engulfing fire at 1475 oF for 30 minutes, while an oil fire can burn for many hours. The most recent NRC report NUREG-2125 does not correctly take into account a long duration high temperature fire and should be redone.
Here are my takeways on the transportation issue:
• Realistic low probability, high consequence accidents should be examined.
• Side impact rail accidents may shatter HBF cladding.
• Long duration, high temperature fires may involve oil tankers that travel the same tracks. NRC has not properly quantified the statistical likelihood.

Sunday, March 30, 2014

SCE Cited For Major Nuclear Related Safety Violation At San Onofre

Get SCE Out of San Onofre
Background: NRC Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Requirements:

“Each licensee shall develop and implement guidance and strategies intended to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire ….”

The San Onofre spent fuel cooling fire protection plan in the event of a large fire and/or explosion hinges on the expertise and staffing of the on-sight San Onofre Fire Department.

Since the San Onofre Fire Department and Emergency Planning Personnel Staffing was reduced to a skeleton crew without prior approval from the NRC after a full and proper evaluation, the existing fire plan is now outdated and unrealistic in event of a large fire or explosion.

A Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Accident, in case of a large fire or explosion without adequate and demonstrated mitigation measures is a MAJOR Nuclear Safety Concern for all the millions of Southern Californians living within the 10 Mile Emergency Protection Zone.  Remember Fukushima's triple meltdowns occurred because of a failure to keep their reactors cool after the big earth quake and tsunami which occurred on 03/11/11.


Last Friday, the NRC cited SCE, the operator of San Onofre's nuclear power plant for violating NRC rules by failing to get approval before eliminating 39 emergency-response jobs after the plant closed last year.

Historically, NRC Region IV has had the habit of citing Southern California Edison with only low level violations, even if the violations were actually severe violations.  This cozy relationship was a contributing factor in the radioactive leak that resulted in the early decommissioning of San Onofre Units 2 & 3 and the loss of billions of dollars to SoCal ratepayers that could have been prevented, if the NRC had enforced the Federal Regulations as written.  This type of safety enforcement is not good for Californians or the NRC.  Now a serious review/investigation and proper action/fines are required by the NRC and its Commissioners, to assure Nuclear Safety is maintained at San Onofre and all the other US Nuclear Power Plants.

The question the NRC should ask is, "Knowing that the SPENT FUEL POOLS MUST STILL BE KEPT COOL 24/7 no matter what, if a major earth quake occurred tonight, would San Onofre Fire Dept.'s skeleton crew be able to guarantee US that they could prevent a nuclear accident from occurring, especially since the 39 emergency-response positions that were illegally eliminated, probably cost ratepayers much less than even one still employed highly paid nuclear manager who would be home sleeping?  

The question that the CPUC should ask is, "If SEC is really interested in safety as they keep telling us, what is the reasonableness of continually cutting corners on those that actually insure our safety, while at the same time retaining other highly paid nuclear Staff?
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Monday, March 24, 2014

Private Profit, Public Debt, The Nuclear Saga Continues In San Clemente

San Onofre Nuke
Would you give 3 hours of your time on Tuesday to lower cancer rates 
in San Clemente and adjacent communities?
Studies show that communities who are actively involved in the decommissioning of their power plants
result in lower radiation readings. Less radiation, less cancer.

On Jan 2012 So Cal Edison' s new steam generators released what they say is a "small amount" of radiation. This "small amount" to them is somewhere in the neighborhood of 80 gallons of highly radioactive cooling water, that turned into highly radioactive steam spread upon the Community of San Clemente.

Each Day San Onofre operated So Cal Edison made an estimated $1 million dollars and produced about 500 lbs of deadly nuclear waste. The $2.7 Billion ratepayers have paid into the San Onofre decommissioning fund only equals about $50 per pound to store this waste for the next million years. These decommissioning funds will have to be spent very wisely.  On top of these funds So Cal Edison says they want another 2 billion dollars for decommissioning and in time we all know this cost will go up.

The question that should be in every Californian's mind is, Just how many nuclear plants has So Cal Edison decommissioned, and what was the radiation rate of the site after they were done?

I would like to see So Cal Edison removed from any further work at San Onofre, replaced by a company with the best track record in the industry for safely returning a site to its former state. Whoever that may be, perhaps San Onofre should be placed on the EPA's superfund list due to the shear amount of radioactive waste found on site.

I do not want to see So Cal Edison spending a "small amount" of the decommissioning funds as they see fit as it stands now, in essence profiting on the mess they have left here in San Clemente, when they have proven time and time again that they can play fast and loose with the facts regarding this now decaying nuclear waste generating station.

I would like to see a Citizens oversight committee in charge of the purse strings related to the decommissioning project that as we all know will last many many years.

To this Citizens oversight committee I would ask
  • to see the data from the current radiation monitoring network on site at SONGS setup for public access on the internet for real time scrutiny of ongoing releases related to the decommissioning.
  • to see a tsunami wall built to the same standards for an expected tsunami that our neighboring city of Dana Point is using, an estimated 42 foot tsunami verses our 14 foot tsunami at low tide, 
  • to see our spent fuel pools hardened against terrorist attack, as losing water to these pool could still devastate the entire west coast of north america. 
  • to see our current dry cask storage moved to a safer location inland, protected by earthen berms and separated by the same amount of space as is standard in the rest of our nations nuclear sites. 
  • to see any high burn up fuel placed in canisters designed for this more dangerous spent fuel.
  • to know if any of the members of this committee have ever received funding from So Cal Edison.