San Onofre Cancer Report by Joe Mangano Published

Joe Mangano The Radiation and Public Health Project  
P.O. Box 1260 Ocean City NJ 08226 

Click here for the RADIOACTIVE EMISSIONS AND HEALTH HAZARDS FROM THE SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR REACTORS IN CALIFORNIA PDF 

Everyone and especially those with small children should consider making a donation to Joe Mangano's* The Radiation and Public Health Project for publishing his San Onofre Cancer Report at no cost, as a public service.

Note: This study comes long before similar studies being done by the NRC which will take years to complete, yet the nuclear industry group already claims that they "won't provide any meaningful data" (see below).

After reading Joe Mangano's study, you can decide for yourself.

* Joseph J. Mangano, MPH, MBA, is Director, Secretary, and the Executive Director of the Radiation and Public Health Project.

Mr. Mangano is a public health administrator and researcher who has studied the connection between low-dose radiation exposure and subsequent risk of diseases such as cancer and damage to newborns.

He has published numerous articles and letters in medical and other journals in addition to books, including Low Level Radiation and Immune System Disorders: An Atomic Era Legacy. There he examines the connection between radiation exposure and current widespread health problems.

For comparison:

CANCER RISKS STUDIED NEAR 7 US NUCLEAR SITES

By STEPHEN SINGER

— Oct. 24 2:03 PM EDT

You are here

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/cancer-risks-studied-near-7-us-nuclear-sites

HARTFORD, Conn. (AP) — Federal regulators say a pilot study of cancer risks posed to residents near seven nuclear power sites in the United States will update 22-year-old data, but an industry group says the study won't come up with anything new.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission says it will study cancer types in infants and the general population near six nuclear power plants and a nuclear-fuel plant for the Navy. The $2 million study is expected to begin in the next three months and continue at least into 2014.

The Nuclear Energy Institute, an industry group, opposes the study, saying it won't likely provide any meaningful data.

The sites are in California, Connecticut, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey and Tennessee.

Related articles

• NRC Public Meeting On the Process To Decommission San Onofre
• San Diego Gas & Electric wants to recover San Onofre investment
• Group links Palisades to death rates; company disputes report
• Decades later, Baby Tooth Survey legacy lives on
• Calls for US seafood testing after revelations of Fukushima radiation leaks
• How to support the "Nuclear Waste Symposium"

Why fatigue damage will stop the NRC from allowing Unit 2 to restart

FATIGUE DAMAGE TO SONGS STEAM GENERATORS

J. Hopenfeld 

Provided to the “DAB Safety Team” as additional explanation of the fatigue damage to SONGS steam generators which was discussed in a report by the author and was submitted to the California Public Utility Commission on March 29, 2013

Note: Links to these documents are listed below 

SCE/MHI made a mistake in their stress analysis, which directly impacts the safety of restarting Unit 2.  When the error is corrected, the result clearly shows that Unit 2 has already used up its allowed fatigue life and is not fit for service any longer.  This means that if Unit 2 is restarted at any power level an abrupt pressure change such as inadvertent closing or opening of a valve or a steam line break could lead to a sudden tube ruptures.   The ASME code and NRC regulations do not permit safety components to operate when their fatigue life has been exhausted.

The source of MHI’s error resulted from how they calculated the increase in the local stress at geometrical discontinuities  (notches), which are formed when two metal surfaces come in contact during vibration.  Since the worn surfaces of the tubes inside the steam generators cannot be seen, MHI made two key assumptions, which are inconsistent with the observation that both the tube and the supporting bar are worn into each other.  First, MHI assumed that the ASME endurance limit could be applied directly to the notched tube surfaces.  Since it is commonly known that surface roughness significantly reduces fatigue life and since the ASME data is for smooth polished surfaces, this assumption would underestimate the amount of fatigue damage.  Second, when using the Peterson chart, MHI assumed unrealistically large fillet radius and consequently derived a low concentration stress factor.  Large radii would decrease the local stress and cause the tube to fail at a higher stress thereby increasing its fatigue life.  Only by using these two, arbitrary non-conservative, assumptions was MHI able to conclude that Unit 2 did not suffer any fatigue damage.

As depicted in the MHI drawings the support bar and the tube form a sharp discontinuity at the contacting surface, therefore the appropriate geometry for calculating the stress concentration is an abrupt geometry change (very small radii), not a large radius shoulder fillet that was assumed by MHI.  When a correction is made to account for the sharp notch, the corrected stress indicates  (see Figure 1 below) that the tubes have used up their fatigue life during the first cycle of operation.  Structures with sharp notches can fail catastrophically when subjected to high cycle vibrations.  (MHI redacted their assumption so the exact value of the radius they used is unknown.)

 The loss of fatigue life is a major defect in the tube material; NRC regulations 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion 16 specify that for a licensee to maintain his operating license, such non-conformance must be promptly identified and corrected.   The licensee must assure that “corrective action (is) taken to preclude repetition.  NRC’s General Design Criteria 4 and 10CFR50 Appendix A also specify that steam generator tubes must be able to “ accommodate the effects of loss of coolant accidents “ The fact that the NRC has not already raised these issues in any of their  “Requests for Additional Information, RAIs” indicates that the NRC would be ignoring its own regulations if it allows SCE to restart Unit 2.

 In Summary: The SCE request for approval to operate Unit 2 at 70 % power for 150 days provided no explanation for the selection of this inspection interval.  The absence of such explanation and the absence of an indication of the actions that would follow demonstrate the unreliability of SCE entire assessment of restarting Unit 2.  Edison did not specify pass/fail criteria for the tubes during the outage inspection.  Given the fact that fatigue damage does not lend itself to detection, SCE request is unacceptable and should be rejected. 

  

The full DAB Safety Team's  Media Alert - 5 Parts:

https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BweZ3c0aFXcFZGpvRlo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=1&docId=15V8BD4YK0MjwUV6gPZt6ILS_lP7CpClzgnZentLfx8U

Which includes both Dr. Hopenfeld's CPUC documents as Parts 4 & 5:

Part 4 https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BweZ3c0aFXcFZGpvRlo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=1&docId=0BweZ3c0aFXcFMC1BNlpMeDQyM2M

Part 5 https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BweZ3c0aFXcFZGpvRlo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=1&docId=0BweZ3c0aFXcFX2gxRDFCRW9CVzg

San Onofre Unit 2 Retainer Bars Could Cause Massive ☢ Leakage

In an accident like a main steam line break at San Onofre, the badly designed retainers bars in Unit 2 could actually make things much worse by causing more damage to any of the 9,727 already fatigued tubes in each of its steam generators which could lead to additional leakage of highly radioactive reactor core coolant and/or cause a nuclear incident or worse a nuclear accident like Fukushima!

Radioactive Leaks and ruptures can happen without notice:

Allegation/Violations

The NRC has decided in AIT follow-up report dated 11/09/2012, “Item 3. “(Closed) Unresolved Item 05000362/2012007-03, ‘Evaluation of Retainer Bars Vibration during the Original Design of the Replacement Steam Generators” as a non-cited violation in accordance with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC’s Enforcement Policy.”  However, as shown below, SCE/MHI’s failure to verify the adequacy of the retainer bar design as required by SCE/MHI’s procedures have resulted in plugging of several hundred tubes in the brand new replacement generators. This has resulted in these violations:

1. Failure to meet NRC Chairman Standards on Nuclear Safety by SCE,
2. Failure to meet Senator Boxer’s Committee on Environment and Public Works
(EPW) Standards on Nuclear Safety by SCE,
3. Failure to enforce SCE Edison Contract Document instructions to MHI by SCE,
4. Failure to meet SONGS Technical Specifications by SCE,
5. Failure to meet general design criteria (GDC) in Appendix A, “General Design
Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” to 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic
Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities GDC 14, “Reactor
Coolant Pressure Boundary” by SCE/MHI,
6. Failure to demonstrate that Unit 2 retainer bars will maintain tube bundle
geometry at 70% power due to fluid elastic instability during a main line
steam break (MSLB) design basis event, and
7. SCE/MHI took shortcuts by avoiding the 10 CFR 50.90 License Amendment
Process under the false pretense of “like for a like” replacement steam
generator.  SCE added 377 more tubes, increased the average length of the
heated tubes and changed the thermal-hydraulic operation of the RSGs without

proper safety analysis and inadequate 10CFR 50.59 Evaluation.

This intentional action to produce more thermal megawatts out of the

RSGs compromised safety at SONGS Unit 2 due to the failure of 90

percent through wall thickness of a tube by the inadequate design of the

r

etainer bar.

Recommended Actions:

NRC San Onofre Special Panel is requested to resolve the above listed Allegations and/or Violations within 30 days of receipt of this email and prior to granting SCE’s permission to do any restart "testing" of Unit 2. Answer all allegations factually, don't just void them.
 
See Full Document: Media Alert: San Onofre Retainer Bar Problems

San Onofre Legacy (SOL Part 1, 2 and 3)

The DAB Safety Team released three Media Alerts today!

Together they describe (in technical detail) the current situation at San Onofre, along with what SCE, their experts and other public nuclear watchdogs are now saying about all the NRC RESTART QUESTIONS they have been told to answer:

1. SONGS Unit 2 Fluid Elastic Instability, Thermal-Hydraulic Modeling, Enlightening Dr. Pettigrew, Concerned/Frustrated NRC Commissioners and Main Steam Break (28 Pages)

snip:

The following paper shows that the entire NRC Regulatory Process is underfunded, broken and needs additional funding, oversight and extensive overhaul to ensure public safety.

2. SCE’s Dismal and Unconvincing Performance before NRC Commissioners (13 Pages)

snip:

The presentation by SCE, Mitsubishi and other experts to the NRC was very disappointing and disturbing to 8.4 million Southern Californians.  The presentation did not address U.S. Sen. Barbara Boxer and Congressman Edward J. Markey’s concerns expressed on February 6, 2013 in her letter to NRC Chairman McFarlane, “Southern California Edison was aware of problems with replacement steam generators at its San Onofre nuclear power plant but chose not to make fixes.

3. Unit 2 Retainer Bars Integrity Unproven and Unsafe During a MSLB  (12 Pages)

snip:

The structural integrity of SONGS degraded retainer bar system to withstand combined loads that result from postulated accident conditions events has not been demonstrated.

NRC Reports Incomplete, Inconclusive, Inconsistent and Unacceptable

The REAL CAUSE of San Onofre's Unit 3 massively expensive failure...

It appears that a complacent SCE and the inexperienced Mitsubishi engineers did not perform proper academic research and industry comparisons about the potential adverse consequences of the reducing the pressures in the original steam generators. Lowering the pressures were the primary cause of shortening the life of the Original Generators due to increased tube wear and plugging caused by random vibrations and also caused the destruction of the new Unit 3 Replacement Steam Generators due to the same thing. 

In addition, Edison engineers prepared a defective NRC report and design specifications, which were not challenged by Mitsubishi, the manufacturer, and/or adequately reviewed by NRC Region IV. Mitsubishi then at the direction of SCE engineers made numerous untested and unanalyzed design changes to the steam generators under the pretense of “like for like”, exchange and even NRC Region IV Director Elmo Collins said, “The guts of the machinery look …. Different.”

So based on a review of the AIT Report and some of the World’s Experts, the three potential causes, which were significant contributors to the “fatigue damage” in San Onofre Unit 3 and the tube-to-tube wear resulting in the tube leak are as follows:

A. Insufficient internal supports and differences in manufacturing or fabrication of the tubes and other components between Units 2 & 3.

B. Due to modeling errors, the SONGS replacement generators were not designed with adequate thermal hydraulic margin to preclude the onset of fluid-elastic instability.

C. Differences between Unit 2 and Unit 3’s Operational Factors


CONCLUSIONS: Until the NRC can determine that San Onofre is 100% safe to operate at its approved rated power, granting any Unit 2 Restart testing is unacceptable, because if a nuclear accident occurred during testing who would be held liable, the Nuclear Utilities, the Insurance Carriers, the Federal Government, the State of California, the CPUC, the NRC Commissioners, NRC Region IV, EIX/SCE Shareholders & Employees or just the millions of affected southern Californians?  The DAB Safety Team believes that once the true amount of existing tube fatigue and all other associated damage is KNOWN, anything short of a total steam generator rebuild and/or replacement will be unacceptable prior to any restart being authorized by the NRC.

2013 is the year to Decommission San Onofre

For much more on this read:

Allegation – NRC AIT Report Incomplete, Inconclusive, Inconsistent and Unacceptable

Unsafe NRC Computer Model Requires Investigation

Snip from:

Press Release 13-01-22 ATHOS Validity Questioned, Qualifying Investigation Required

The validity of the ATHOS T/H computer model for San Onofre Unit 2 at Main Steam Line Break  conditions requires that the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations complete a Qualifying Investigation to assure steam generator tube integrity before any restart decision is made.

PROBLEM STATEMENT: The computer thermal-hydraulic models cannot account for all the mechanical factors and extremely narrow tube-to-tube clearance differences, which would very likely contribute to catastrophic tube-to-tube wear (fluid elastic instability) in San Onofre Unit 2.  In light of the 8 tube failures of Unit 3 at Main Stream Line Break testing conditions, fluid elastic instability can cause cascading tube leakages/ruptures in Unit 2 even at 70% power due to Steam Generator pressure and temperature changes caused by, for example, a main steam line break, earthquake, loss of offsite power, stuck main steam safety valve and/or other operational transients.  The cascading tube failures would “pop like popcorn” (as described by nuclear expert Arnie Gundersen) and cause excessive offsite radiation exposures.  Operator Action as claimed by Edison to re-pressurize the steam generators is not feasible to stop a major nuclear accident in Unit 2 in the first 15 minutes of a Main Stream Line Break,  stuck open SG safety valve, earthquake, steam generator tube ruptures and other operational transients during the preposed 5-month trial TEST PERIOD.

INVESTIGATION REQUEST: The DAB Safety Team seeks to assist the NRR by requesting a Qualifying Investigation, as noted above and by providing additional information, as noted below.

For much more read  DAB Safety Team Documents     “Media Alert 13-01-22 Faulty Modeling And Unreasonable Operator Actions Make San Onofre Restart Unsafe”, “Emergency Preparedness at San Onofre”, “Managing Control Room Safety” and Press Release: “TEST: Viability of Operator Actions to Prevent Offsite Radiation Releases 

=====

Some useful nuclear phrases:

Normal operational conditions

Normal operational conditions mean that the nuclear power plant is operated according to the Technical Specifications and operational procedures. These also include tests, plant start-up and shutdown, maintenance and refueling.

Anticipated operational transient

An anticipated operational transient means a deviation from normal operational conditions, which is milder than an accident and which can be expected to occur once or several times over a period of a hundred operating years.

 Unanticipated operational transient

An unanticipated operational transient means a deviation from normal operational conditions, which is not proceduralized and Plant Operator does not recognize that condition.   A good example are the so called SONGS Unit 3 false alarm from loose parts vibration monitoring system for which there is no explanation from SCE, NRC or Westinghouse.  Another example would be a leakage from a pump pumping radioactive fluid without any area radiation monitors to warn the operators of the leakage.

=====

Accident

An accident means such a deviation from normal operational conditions as is not an anticipated operational transient. There are two classes of accident: postulated accidents and severe accidents. Based on the initiating event, postulated accidents are further divided into two sub-classes whose acceptance criteria are described in Guide YVL 6.2.

Postulated accident

A postulated accident means such a nuclear power plant safety system design-basis event as the nuclear power plant is required to withstand without any serious damage to the fuel and without discharges of radioactive substances so large that, in the plant’s vicinity, extensive measures should be taken to limit the radiation exposure of the population.

Severe accident

OMG................. Talk about SanO Nuclear Denial* “severe accident” is not even listed in the 130 page NRC Collection of Abbreviations, but if you do a computer search for it on the NRC website you find this:

Severe accident

A type of accident that may challenge safety systems at a level much higher than expected.

* http://is.gd/XPjMd0
The illogical belief that Nature cannot destroy any land based nuclear reactor, any place anytime