Nuclear Reactors Have No Off Switch Arnie Gundersen

'The Fukushima Nuclear Accident -
Lessons for California from then Prime Minister Kan and other distinguished speakers.'

In this segment, Arnie Gundersen, Chief Engineer, Fairewinds Associates, gives his analysis of the lessons learned from Fukushima applied to San Onofre.

The public forum, held June 4, 2013 in the San Diego City Council chambers, was organized by Torgen Johnson.

View Arnie Gundersens presentation here 

Captured by EON and re-posted here as a public service.

Sooner or later, in any foolproof system, the fools exceed the proofs! ~ Arnie Gundersen 

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• Ex-PM Naoto Kan attends anti-nuclear symposium in California
• The Naoto Kan Line
• Fairewinds: Radiation levels actually rising in Fukushima - Started going up again last fall (VIDEO)
• San Onofre nuclear plant - restarting it would be an experiment on the public!
• Nuke Industry Double Standards? Fairewinds web site hacked again!

Lessons From Fukushima For San Onofre

Lessons From Fukushima For San Onofre 

Two public figures who led the response in Japan and the United States to the Fukushima reactor crisis will appear together Tuesday for the first time to outline the lessons of Fukushima for Southern California, which now awaits the decision on whether or not the leaky San Onofre reactors near San Diego will be restarted.

Former Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan will discuss his concerns about the inherent dangers posed by nuclear reactors. He will be joined by former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chair Gregory Jaczko, who has emerged as a leading critic of safety at U.S. nuclear power plants.

The event will be available live both to reporters in San Diego and via phone feed and Webcast to members of the news media elsewhere in the U.S.

News event speakers will be:

• The Honorable Naoto Kan, former Prime Minister of Japan from June 2010 to August 2011;
• Gregory Jaczko, former chair of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission from May 2009 to July 2012;
• Peter A. Bradford, adjunct professor at the Vermont Law School, a former member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and a former utility commission chair in New York and Maine;
• Arnold "Arnie" Gundersen, chief engineer of the energy consulting company Fairewinds Associates, and a former nuclear power industry executive; and 
• Dave Roberts, County Board of Supervisors, San Diego.

FOR PEOPLE OUTSIDE OF SO CAL : A live Webcast from this news event will be available to reporters outside of San Diego, CA., starting at 8:30 a.m. PDT/11:30 a.m. EDT on June 4, 2013, at http://av4b.com/live/


FOR PEOPLE IN SO CAL: Members of the media in the San Diego area are invited to attend the seminar starting at 8:30 a.m. PDT on June 4, 2013, at the Chambers of the San Diego County Board of Supervisors, 3rd Floor, 1600 Pacific Highway, San Diego. (MAP)


MEDIA CONTACT: Alex Frank at (703) 276-3264 or afrank@hastingsgroup.com. 

What Part Of Fukushima Do You Not Understand? 

Related articles

• Ex-PM Naoto Kan attends anti-nuclear symposium in California
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• San Onofre at the Brink: Nuclear Free Action now Ready to WIN
• Former NRC head has concerns about San Onofre restart plan
• Naoto Kan Was Guest of Honor at an Anti-Nuclear Event in San Diego, California, Said It Was He Who Stopped TEPCO from "Abandoning" #Fukushima I Nuke Plant
• San Onofre at the No Nukes Brink

San Onofre Legacy (SOL Part 1, 2 and 3)

The DAB Safety Team released three Media Alerts today!

Together they describe (in technical detail) the current situation at San Onofre, along with what SCE, their experts and other public nuclear watchdogs are now saying about all the NRC RESTART QUESTIONS they have been told to answer:

1. SONGS Unit 2 Fluid Elastic Instability, Thermal-Hydraulic Modeling, Enlightening Dr. Pettigrew, Concerned/Frustrated NRC Commissioners and Main Steam Break (28 Pages)

snip:

The following paper shows that the entire NRC Regulatory Process is underfunded, broken and needs additional funding, oversight and extensive overhaul to ensure public safety.

2. SCE’s Dismal and Unconvincing Performance before NRC Commissioners (13 Pages)

snip:

The presentation by SCE, Mitsubishi and other experts to the NRC was very disappointing and disturbing to 8.4 million Southern Californians.  The presentation did not address U.S. Sen. Barbara Boxer and Congressman Edward J. Markey’s concerns expressed on February 6, 2013 in her letter to NRC Chairman McFarlane, “Southern California Edison was aware of problems with replacement steam generators at its San Onofre nuclear power plant but chose not to make fixes.

3. Unit 2 Retainer Bars Integrity Unproven and Unsafe During a MSLB  (12 Pages)

snip:

The structural integrity of SONGS degraded retainer bar system to withstand combined loads that result from postulated accident conditions events has not been demonstrated.

So Cal Edison San Onofre Lies

Fairewinds' Arnie Gundersen was interviewed on Russia Today to discuss Southern California Edison's "San Onofre" Power Plant. Arnie says, "The worst plant in the U.S. for evacuation plans, is San Onofre. When they built it in the fifties, no one was around it, but Southern California has grown dramatically. So it would be almost impossible to evacuate the area." Later on he discusses why, and what this could mean.

Report: Edison knew of nuclear-plant generator flaws

Unsafe NRC Computer Model Requires Investigation

Snip from:

Press Release 13-01-22 ATHOS Validity Questioned, Qualifying Investigation Required

The validity of the ATHOS T/H computer model for San Onofre Unit 2 at Main Steam Line Break  conditions requires that the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations complete a Qualifying Investigation to assure steam generator tube integrity before any restart decision is made.

PROBLEM STATEMENT: The computer thermal-hydraulic models cannot account for all the mechanical factors and extremely narrow tube-to-tube clearance differences, which would very likely contribute to catastrophic tube-to-tube wear (fluid elastic instability) in San Onofre Unit 2.  In light of the 8 tube failures of Unit 3 at Main Stream Line Break testing conditions, fluid elastic instability can cause cascading tube leakages/ruptures in Unit 2 even at 70% power due to Steam Generator pressure and temperature changes caused by, for example, a main steam line break, earthquake, loss of offsite power, stuck main steam safety valve and/or other operational transients.  The cascading tube failures would “pop like popcorn” (as described by nuclear expert Arnie Gundersen) and cause excessive offsite radiation exposures.  Operator Action as claimed by Edison to re-pressurize the steam generators is not feasible to stop a major nuclear accident in Unit 2 in the first 15 minutes of a Main Stream Line Break,  stuck open SG safety valve, earthquake, steam generator tube ruptures and other operational transients during the preposed 5-month trial TEST PERIOD.

INVESTIGATION REQUEST: The DAB Safety Team seeks to assist the NRR by requesting a Qualifying Investigation, as noted above and by providing additional information, as noted below.

For much more read  DAB Safety Team Documents     “Media Alert 13-01-22 Faulty Modeling And Unreasonable Operator Actions Make San Onofre Restart Unsafe”, “Emergency Preparedness at San Onofre”, “Managing Control Room Safety” and Press Release: “TEST: Viability of Operator Actions to Prevent Offsite Radiation Releases 

=====

Some useful nuclear phrases:

Normal operational conditions

Normal operational conditions mean that the nuclear power plant is operated according to the Technical Specifications and operational procedures. These also include tests, plant start-up and shutdown, maintenance and refueling.

Anticipated operational transient

An anticipated operational transient means a deviation from normal operational conditions, which is milder than an accident and which can be expected to occur once or several times over a period of a hundred operating years.

 Unanticipated operational transient

An unanticipated operational transient means a deviation from normal operational conditions, which is not proceduralized and Plant Operator does not recognize that condition.   A good example are the so called SONGS Unit 3 false alarm from loose parts vibration monitoring system for which there is no explanation from SCE, NRC or Westinghouse.  Another example would be a leakage from a pump pumping radioactive fluid without any area radiation monitors to warn the operators of the leakage.

=====

Accident

An accident means such a deviation from normal operational conditions as is not an anticipated operational transient. There are two classes of accident: postulated accidents and severe accidents. Based on the initiating event, postulated accidents are further divided into two sub-classes whose acceptance criteria are described in Guide YVL 6.2.

Postulated accident

A postulated accident means such a nuclear power plant safety system design-basis event as the nuclear power plant is required to withstand without any serious damage to the fuel and without discharges of radioactive substances so large that, in the plant’s vicinity, extensive measures should be taken to limit the radiation exposure of the population.

Severe accident

OMG................. Talk about SanO Nuclear Denial* “severe accident” is not even listed in the 130 page NRC Collection of Abbreviations, but if you do a computer search for it on the NRC website you find this:

Severe accident

A type of accident that may challenge safety systems at a level much higher than expected.

* http://is.gd/XPjMd0
The illogical belief that Nature cannot destroy any land based nuclear reactor, any place anytime

So Cal Edison Playing With Your Life

The Games People Play

In this week's podcast, Fairewinds looks at how difficult it is for the public to meaningfully participate in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's licensing process.  Arnie Gundersen was retained by Friends of the Earth to assess major problems at the San Onofre nuclear plant in California that have caused a year long shutdown.  Arnie met with the NRC this week concerning  his analysis of what went wrong and how the problems were foreseeable.  In this podcast, Arnie discusses how the NRC and Southern California Edison deliberately withheld information to make his technical analysis more difficult to accomplish.  Fairewinds taped the meeting, so our podcast listeners can hear for themselves the difficulties Arnie encountered and the games the NRC and Southern California Edison played to prevent his participation.

download link

NRC Violating Presidential Directive and the Public Trust

SCE’s PR Machine Is Capable Of Overcoming ALL Hurdles,

Except Good Science And Safety

Albert Einstein also described INSANITY as

Doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. 

The DAB Safety Team has challenged previously in their published DAB Safety Team Documents, that Southern California Edison’s controversial plan to restart San Onofre Unit 2 as a “Bogus and dangerous SCE experiment.”  

According to SONGS Anonymous Insiders, SCE’s Engineers were under the false impression that Unit 3 Anti-vibration Structure was built better than Unit 2.  Therefore, SCE Engineers were operating Unit 3 at lower steam pressures than Unit 2 in a test mode to generate more thermal megawatts and thereby generate more electricity.

 To add to Arnie Gundersen’s and John Large’s Technical Affidavits, DAB Safety Team’s investigation reveals that in the process of this “money-hungry experiment”, lower steam pressures in combination with other unapproved and unanalyzed design changes destroyed Unit 3 due to Fluid Elasticity Instability (FEI). SCE and NRC AIT Team both blamed Unit 3 FEI on botched up MHI Computer Modeling and insufficient tube-to-AVB gaps. AREVA, Westinghouse, John Large and the DAB Safety Team findings dispute these statements. The NRC Augmented Inspection Team and the NRR Panel have swept the DAB Safety Team Findings consistently under the rug, in what must be now labeled as a Gov’t cover-up!

The NRC keeps issuing both controversial and conflicting press statements that a decision to allow the restart of Unit 2 could come as early as March 2013.  According to SONGS anonymous insiders, Edison officials have announced in internal SONGS Staff Meetings that a restart decision is imminent in March despite the huge public outcry about safety problems by SCE.  Press reports as of January 14, 2013 state, “Small steps are being taken to prepare for possibly restarting the troubled San Onofre nuclear power plant, even as its future remains clouded with uncertainty, officials said Monday. Nuclear Regulatory Commission senior inspector Greg Warnick said Monday that the agency is beginning to prepare a detailed plan of what would need to be done to bring the plant safely back to service.” (SOURCE: CBS Los Angeles, Associated Press)

NRC’s enforcement history, drama and pre-rehearsed tough questions, press reports, casual relationship and/or protection of SCE officials and utility biased public meetings are just old and cheap regulatory tricks that are now being used to protect the NRC’s own public image and to fool the public into believing that the NRC is really concerned about public safety regarding SCE’s Restart Plan.  The Justice Department & NRR Officials need to set up a legal/technical taskforce to publically question Edison’s design and MHI Engineer’s listed below under oath regarding their:

1. Understanding of their legal obligations under the 10 CFR 50.59 Process,
2. Understanding of problems with the original steam generators,
3. Critical questioning and professional/investigative skills,
4. Efforts made in industry and academic benchmarking to identify and resolve problems with the original steam generators
5. What part did they play in the preparation of design specifications, fabrication, computer modeling, mock-up testing, anti-vibration bar structure, and research required to prevent the adverse effects of fluid elasticity and flow-induced random vibrations in these unique San Onofre Combustion Engineering replacement generators.

Any NRC decision to grant a restart of Unit 2 without a formal 50.90 licensing review along with public participation will be seen as an invitation to risk a Fukushima-type disaster happening in Southern California. 

Read More:  Allegation - NRC Violating President’s Directive And the Public Trust is posted on the web at this link: DAB Safety Team Documents.

Copyright January 17, 2013 by The DAB Safety Team. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast or redistributed without crediting the DAB Safety Team. The contents cannot be altered without the Written Permission of the DAB Safety Team Leader and/or the DAB Safety Team’s Attorney

SCE Violated Federal Reg.’s And the Public Trust

Nuclear Experts Agree, San Onofre’s Replacement Steam Generators Are Unsafe

Summation: Based upon our ongoing review of evaluations, engineering analyses, inspections, technical and operational assessment reports prepared by the NRC’s Augmented Inspection Team, MHI, SCE, Westinghouse, AREVA, Professor Daniel Hirsch, industry experts and knowledgeable whistle blowers, along with the recent affidavits prepared by Arnie Gundersen and John Large, we reaffirm the following statements which have been previously substantiated in numerous DAB Safety Team Documents:

1. The DAB Safety Team has been saying for months for a long time that SCE and MHI Engineers did a very poor job in their review of Academic Research Papers and Industry Comparisons about how to prevent the adverse effects of fluid elastic instability in the design of San Onofre's replacement steam generators because the original Combustion Engineering designed steam generators did not experience the adverse effects of fluid elastic instability. Nuclear Expert, John Large statesA, “I have little confidence in the outcome of AREVA’s projection of the time period through which the U2 nuclear plant could be reliably expected to operate without incurring a tube failure or running at a greater risk of a tube failure occurring. ... In my opinion, simply sweeping the fluid elastic instability issue under the carpet on the basis ... it will not reoccur at 70% power is not only disingenuous but foolhardy.” TheNRC chairman has publicly stated, “SCE is responsible for the work of its vendor and its contractor.” DAB Safety Team alleges that SCE actions are in violation of the Federal Regulations, its CPUC Charter, the NRC Chairman Standards and even its own advertised charter of “Overriding Obligations to Shareholders and Public Safety.”


2. Accidents involving steam generator depressurization (main steam line break), station blackout and other anticipated transient events causing steam generators over-pressurization can occur at any time over the full range of normal operating conditions up to Reactor Thermal Power (3438 MWs). Therefore BY DESIGN, these replacement steam generators are NOT capable of protecting their already worn and cracked tubes from radioactive leakages and/or ruptures caused by the above.

3. In Unit 2, these already fatigued, cracked, and heavily degraded tubes can snap, leak and/or rupture at the tube sheet, tube support plate or the unsupported anti-vibration bars mid and free spans during these postulated adverse accident conditions. John Large statesA, “For the MSLB event very high, two-phase fluid cross-flow velocities would be expected to instantaneously develop in the U-bend region, triggering vigorous FEI that could, particularly if the AVB restraints are ineffective, promote violent tube to tube clashing and the potential for a multiple tube failure event.”

4. It is ABSOLUTELY CLEAR, that San Onofre Unit 2 replacement steam generators will likely experience single to multiple tube-to-tube failures (e.g., San Onofre Unit 3, Mihama Unit 2, North Anna, Indian Point 2 and Craus, France, etc.) during these postulated adverse licensed conditions at any power level up to 100% Power (Licensed Reactor Thermal Power of 3438 MWTs).


5. The proposed Defense-in-Depth instrumentation, along with unreliable and unproven operator actions to detect multiple tube leaks/ruptures and/or to re-pressurize the steam generators during these postulated adverse licensed conditions as claimed by Edison are not practical to stop a major nuclear accident from progressing and causing a Unit 2 meltdown.

6. There are conflicting, contradicting, ambiguous and confusing findings between the experts in the Unit 2 Operational Assessments: Such conflicting disagreements over the cause of Tube To Tube Wear reflects poorly on the depth of understanding of this crucially important FEI issue by SCE, each of these SCE consultants and the designer/manufacturer of the Replacement steam generators. The DAB Safety Team’s findings contradict the SCE and all the three NEI qualified, “US Nuclear Plant Designers” findings about Unit 2 FEI (See, Overview – Consequences of a Main Steam Line Break).

7. The DAB Safety Team Comments about SCE 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation for RSGs: The Big Number 1 Attachment Notes shows the comparison between San Onofre and Palo Verde's Replacement Steam Generator design parameters. Palo Verde has the largest CE RSGs in the world (~ 800 Tons each) and SONGS Replacement Steam Generators are the second largest CE Replacement Steam Generators in the world (~ 620 Tons each). John Large statesA, “In my opinion, the changes, tests and experiments (CTE) inherent in the SCE proposal to restart Unit 2: (a) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (b) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident previously evaluated; and (c) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Arnie Gundersen statesB, “It is my professional opinion that Edison should have applied for the 50.59 process so that the FSAR license amendment evaluation and public hearings would have occurred six years ago, prior to creating an accident scenario and facing losses that by the end of this process will easily total more than $1 Billion.” Therefore, the DAB Safety Team concludes that SCE claims as stated are not factual. SCE did not meet the 10CFR50, Appendix B, Quality assurance Standards and has violated the NRC 10 CFR 50.90 Regulations.

8. The Public expects that the Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) comply with President Barack Obama, Senator Barbara Boxer and NRC Chairman’s Open Government Initiative. Under no circumstances should the NRR permit SCE to restart unit 2 without replacing the defective replacement steam generators, a full NRC 50.90 Licensing Amendment and transparent trial-like public hearings.
A http://libcloud.s3.amazonaws.com/93/80/a/2680/R3218-Large-AF2-redacted_proprietary.pdf
B http://libcloud.s3.amazonaws.com/93/b5/f/2677/2013_1_11_FOE_Gundersen_Affidavit_reEdisonSanOnofreRSG.pdf

Full Media Alert 13-01-15 Allegation - SCE Violated Federal Reg's And The Public Trust is posted on the web at this link: DAB SafetyTeam Documents.

###
The DAB Safety Team: Don, Ace and a BATTERY of safety-conscious San Onofre insiders plus industry experts from around the world who wish to remain anonymous. These volunteers assist the DAB Safety Team by sharing knowledge, opinions and insight but are not responsible for the contents of the DAB Safety Team's reports. We continue to work together as a Safety Team to prepare additional: DAB Safety Team Documents, which explain in detail why a SONGS restart is unsafe at any power level without a Full/Thorough/Transparent NRC 50.90 License Amendment and Evidentiary Public Hearings. For more information from The DAB Safety Team, please visit the link above.

Our Mission: To prevent a Trillion Dollar Eco-Disaster like Fukushima, from happening in the USA.

Copyright January 14, 2013 by The DAB Safety Team. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast or redistributed without crediting the DAB Safety Team. The contents cannot be altered without the Written Permission of the DAB Safety Team Leader and/or the DAB Safety Team’s Attorney

NRC Ignores Regulations At San Onofre

In this week's Fairewinds podcast Arnie Gundersen discusses recent problems at two nuclear reactors and how the NRC is failing to enforce its own laws governing those reactors. Gundersen discusses nuclear containment problems at the Ft. Calhoun reactor near Omaha and accident release rates at the San Onofre nuclear plant south of Los Angeles. In both cases, the NRC seems willing to ignore its own regulations and allow these two damaged reactors to restart.

download link

14 Reactor Safety Questions That Edison Needs To Answer Regarding San Onofre

The 14 most important questions that the DAB Safety Team feels must be answered before the NRC, Atomic Safety Licensing Board, NRC Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulations and Nuclear Regulatory Research can complete their investigation regarding the reasonableness of the actions of SCE with respect to San Onofre steam generator replacements and their subsequent safe operation:

1 - According to some Newspaper Comments and Industry Reports in 2004, the going price for each of the four 620 Ton CE Replacement Steam Generator was estimated to be between 175-200 Million Dollars (Per Piece). How did SCE CNO/President in 2004 convince MHI to build such large, complicated, innovative and complex steam generators for 569 million dollars, which is almost 130 million dollars short of the market price and funds approved by CPCU? 

Note: The steam generator project execution began in 2004 after a SCE cost-benefit analysis, which revealed that replacement of major parts and components would save $1bn for Southern California Edison customers during the plant's license period. Instead, the ratepayers have lost $1bn in less than 2 years due to SCE’s in-house design teams mistakes.

2 - Since MHI only had experience building Fort Calhoun’s Generator of less than 320 tons, how did the SCE Engineers Technically Qualify MHI?

3 - Which other utilities’ QA Programs, did SCE take the credit for, to approve Mitsubishi’s quality assurance program. Fort Calhoun? French? Belgium? Japan?

4 – Why did SCE did not apply to NRC for increasing the plugging limit for the Old CE Generators, so they would have had more time to think, research and not rush according to Michael Peevey?

5 - Which CE Replacement Generator US Utilities did SCE benchmark to develop such detailed design and performance specifications or did they just modify the CE Old Generator Specifications with New Industry Information?  Were the SCE engineers, who wrote, checked and approved the specifications steam generator experts or was another steam generator expert in the background, who directed all the SCE work?

6 - Where did all the claims of challenges, reward, innovations and teamwork between SCE and MHI go wrong?

7 - Were the SCE Engineers sent to Japan to check MHI work and approve documents /test results qualified in that field, or they were just training/sight-seeing?

8 - Who at SCE made the decision to make all these numerous design changes and determined the changes were "Like for Like" and did not need a Licensing Amendment Process?

9 - Which SCE Engineer provided all these changes, information and documents to which NRC Engineer, who then made the decision that it was OK to proceed without a full Licensing Amendment Process?

10 - Which SCE engineer(s) approved/validated the MHI Thermal-Hydraulic FIT-III FIVATS code Inputs and Calculations?

11 - To get 10% heat transfer equivalent by switching from Alloy 600 To alloy 690, SCE needed to add 935 tubes, but they only added 377 tubes. What happened to the balance of 568 tubes? Did the SCE Engineers tell MHI to increase the length of 9727 tubes and by how much to make up for the 533 tubes?

12 – Why did the SCE Engineers did not question the MHI benchmarking, verification and validation of the FIT-III thermal-hydraulic model?

13 – Why did the SCE engineers did not contact their counter parts at PVNGS for information/advice, since PVNGS has the Largest CE Replacement Generators (800 Tons) in the world, were built in early 2001-2005 time frames and are running successfully?

14 - Were the original CE Steam Generators and new replacement generators exact in Thermal Output (MWe) or were their minor differences?

14 Reactor Safety Questions
That Edison Needs To Answer
Regarding San Onofre 

The DAB Safety Team has transmitted the following report this morning to the Chairman of the NRC, Atomic Safety Licensing Board, NRC Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulations and Nuclear Regulatory Research:

“SONGS Unit 2 Dangerous Replacement Steam Generators:

 SCE’s Embarrassing Technical Performance Trying To Justify A Restart

 Of Unit 2, To The NRC, At Their November 30, 2012 Public Meeting.”

The 78 page technical document includes 14 questions that affect US Reactor SAFETY, that the NRC, NRR and RES Regulators need to ask SCE to answer at their Dec 18, 2012 NRR/RES Meeting.

 ==========

Snip From The Report:

Unit 2 now has hundreds of times more bad tubes and a thousand times more indications of wear on its tubes than the typical reactor in the country with a new steam generator, and nearly five times as many plugged tubes as the rest of the replacement steam generators, over a comparable operating period, in the country combined.  Therefore, the restart of Unit 2 with thousands of degraded tubes present a formidable challenge to the safe restart of Unit 2 plan by making it highly vulnerable to localized steam dry-outs, 100% void fractions, fluid elastic instability, flow-induced random vibrations, cascading tube ruptures during unanticipated operational occurrences and or Main Steam Line Breaks.  In short, SCE is trying to Restart Unit 2’s Degraded RSG’s, which are outside the NORM of the NRC Regulations.

The NRC Chairman has stated that SCE is responsible for the work of its vendors and contractors. Westinghouse states that none of the MHI fabrication issues were extensively analyzed in the SCE root cause evaluation.”  It is the DAB Safety Team’s opinion that SCE claims that insufficient contact forces in Unit 3 Tube-to-AVB Gaps ALONE caused tube "to" tube wear are misleading, erroneous and designed to put the blame on MHI for purposes of making SCE look good in the public’s eyes and for collecting insurance money from MHI’s manufacturing so called defects. 

=========

The full report will also be posted on the web at this link: San Onofre Papers

or here:  SCE NRC Presentation Analysis + 14 Questions 12-12-17

###

The DAB Safety Team: Don, Ace and a BATTERY of safety-conscious San Onofre insiders plus industry experts from around the world who wish to remain anonymous.  These volunteers assist the DAB Safety Team by sharing knowledge, opinions and insight but are in no way responsible for the contents of the DAB Safety Team's reports.  We continue to work together as a Safety Team to prepare additional San Onofre Papers, which explain in detail why a SONGS restart is unsafe at any power level.  For more information from The DAB Safety Team, please visit the link above.

Our Mission: To prevent a Trillion Dollar Eco-Disaster, like Fukushima, from happening in the USA.

Press Release

The DAB Safety Team: December 17, 2012

Media Contact: Don Leichtling (619) 296-9928 or Ace Hoffman (760) 720-7261 

Concerning SCE’s NRC Technical Presentation on 12-11-30

Copyright December 17, 2012 by The DAB Safety Team. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast or redistributed without crediting the DAB Safety Team. The contents cannot be altered without the Written Permission of the DAB Safety Team Leader and/or the DAB Safety Team’s Attorneys.