Showing posts with label Nuclear. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nuclear. Show all posts

Monday, July 11, 2016

NUCLEAR WASTE ACTION ALERT

NUCLEAR WASTE ACTION ALERT:
By Jerry Collamer
Residents Organized for a Safe Environment (ROSE) and San Onofre High Level Nuke Dump are encouraging environmental activists to organize their members to visit/contact all of their state and federal elected officials to demand they take action on our nation's critical nuclear waste issues,  “what and where to put America’s growing stockpiles of waste?” Many of us working on this think that now is the time for a big push. With 14 nuke plants decommissioning and more to come soon we cannot wait any longer for strong action to be taken. Let’s get organized across the country!
We all know that in the beginning of the nuclear madness, it was promised that in 40 years the solution to nuclear waste would be figured out by the time it was needed. This did not come true, it has not been figured out. Instead, in August 2014 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission turned all NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS into NUCLEAR WASTE DUMPS for a minimum of 200 years. US taxpayers over these past years have now subsidized the nuclear industry with over 14 trillion dollars. Also, the Department of Energy is paying these nuclear plants MILLIONS OF DOLLARS MORE EACH YEAR TO STORE THEIR NUCLEAR WASTE ONSITE IN YOUR BACKYARD! WE MUST STOP MAKING MORE NUCLEAR WASTE NOW.  We also know that it is no longer satisfactory to let our elected officials keep kicking this nuclear canister down the road. We must demand action from our government and the nuclear industry to find the solutions that are needed, and our anti-nuclear activists must have a seat at this table. Our generation of activists cannot be the one that lets this INACTION continue for another 200 years! Yes, of course,I know some of us have been working on this for years, but few have been listening to us, but now the “times they are a changin.” More people are now listening to us and WE MUST ACT NOW!
Listen to former chairperson of the NRC, Allison MacFarlane's talk at the June 22nd CEP meeting. This nuclear waste information is very important if you want to get the DOE and the government moving on the waste issue. Video 1, start the video at 1:55:30 to hear the entire talk at: http://www.songscommunity.com/cep-events/062216_event.asp
Please take action by using this link to contact your elected officials:
Please take action by using the links below to contact your elected officials:
House of Representative http://www.house.gov/representatives/find/


As a reminder, the Invitation for Public Comment closes on Sunday July 31st at 11:59 PM ET. Please email your comments to consentbasedsiting@hq.doe.gov or submit them using the options listed in the Federal Register notice before the closing date to have them considered in the draft summary report. Additionally, we are posting comments received to our website, and the first batch reflecting public input through July 1st is provided below. Comments received from July 1st - 31st will be posted in a similar manner after July 31st. Link to the document: http://www.energy.gov/ne/downloads/invitation-public-comment-inform-design-consent-based-siting-process

Sunday, March 30, 2014

SCE Cited For Major Nuclear Related Safety Violation At San Onofre

Get SCE Out of San Onofre
Background: NRC Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Requirements:

“Each licensee shall develop and implement guidance and strategies intended to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire ….”

The San Onofre spent fuel cooling fire protection plan in the event of a large fire and/or explosion hinges on the expertise and staffing of the on-sight San Onofre Fire Department.

Since the San Onofre Fire Department and Emergency Planning Personnel Staffing was reduced to a skeleton crew without prior approval from the NRC after a full and proper evaluation, the existing fire plan is now outdated and unrealistic in event of a large fire or explosion.

A Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Accident, in case of a large fire or explosion without adequate and demonstrated mitigation measures is a MAJOR Nuclear Safety Concern for all the millions of Southern Californians living within the 10 Mile Emergency Protection Zone.  Remember Fukushima's triple meltdowns occurred because of a failure to keep their reactors cool after the big earth quake and tsunami which occurred on 03/11/11.


Last Friday, the NRC cited SCE, the operator of San Onofre's nuclear power plant for violating NRC rules by failing to get approval before eliminating 39 emergency-response jobs after the plant closed last year.

Historically, NRC Region IV has had the habit of citing Southern California Edison with only low level violations, even if the violations were actually severe violations.  This cozy relationship was a contributing factor in the radioactive leak that resulted in the early decommissioning of San Onofre Units 2 & 3 and the loss of billions of dollars to SoCal ratepayers that could have been prevented, if the NRC had enforced the Federal Regulations as written.  This type of safety enforcement is not good for Californians or the NRC.  Now a serious review/investigation and proper action/fines are required by the NRC and its Commissioners, to assure Nuclear Safety is maintained at San Onofre and all the other US Nuclear Power Plants.

The question the NRC should ask is, "Knowing that the SPENT FUEL POOLS MUST STILL BE KEPT COOL 24/7 no matter what, if a major earth quake occurred tonight, would San Onofre Fire Dept.'s skeleton crew be able to guarantee US that they could prevent a nuclear accident from occurring, especially since the 39 emergency-response positions that were illegally eliminated, probably cost ratepayers much less than even one still employed highly paid nuclear manager who would be home sleeping?  

The question that the CPUC should ask is, "If SEC is really interested in safety as they keep telling us, what is the reasonableness of continually cutting corners on those that actually insure our safety, while at the same time retaining other highly paid nuclear Staff?
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Friday, March 21, 2014

To all who will help make California safe for our children's future

To all who will help make California safe for our children's future,

Public meeting of the new SCE CEP (Community Engagement Panel) about the decommissioning of SONGS will be Tuesday, March 25 from 6 to 9 p.m. . The meeting will be held at the San Clemente Community Center and people will have a 3 minute comment period at some point in this meeting.  San Clemente Community Center is located at 100 North Calle Seville, San Clemente, CA.

This is the start of a very important process for our community and all of Southern California. Please tell your friend and show up to this meeting if at all possible.

Just some of the issues we need talked about are at this meeting:

High burnup fuel at San Onofre 
Waste storage at San Onofre
Dry Cask being storage in the safest way
If problem happens in the Cask what is SCE plan to mitigate this problem, if none exist then SCE needs to develop adequate strategies to detect and mitigate unexpected degradation during dry storage.
transportation casks for HBF does not exist

I will send another email with the latest document from Marvin Resnikoff and Donna Gilmore on High burnup fuel.

Sincerely,
Gene Stone
Residents Organized For a Safe Environment (ROSE)

Thursday, July 4, 2013

Germany's Clean Energy Push: What Can the World Learn

Can Germany Lead California To Energy Freedom?

Germany's Clean Energy Push: What Can the World Learn

Register Now
Live, Free Webinar*

Tue, Jul 9, 2013 11:00 AM - 12:00 PM EDT

Known as the Energiewende, or "energy transition", Germany's campaign to move to renewable power is ambitious, massively popular at home, and by many accounts, quite successful. With 25% of Germany's electricity currently being sourced from solar, wind, and biomass generation and a target of 80% renewable by 2050 in place, the German energy economy is worth watching.

What can the rest of Europe, the U.S., and other nations learn from one wealthy nation's aggressive clean energy push? Will Germany succeed in meeting its goals? Which are its biggest obstacles? And perhaps most importantly, can other nations replicate Germany's most positive achievements? Join us as we ask:

- What distinguishes Germany in terms of economics or political will that has made energiewende possible? Which nations have similar qualities?
- What has been Germany's most successful strategy in cleaning up its energy mix?
- Is the decision to eliminate nuclear power after the Fukushima event consistent with Germany's goals?
- What could prevent other nations from adopting similar strategies?

Featuring:

- Rainer Baake:
Director of Agora-Energiewende, former Deputy Minister of the German Federal Environmental Ministry

- Dr. Sören Buttkereit:
Vice President of regulatory strategies for Siemens Energy, focused on market design in the power sector and the adaptations required for a successful transition towards systems with a higher share of (intermittent) renewables.

- Stephanie Wang
Regulatory Policy Director for the Clean Coalition, a nonprofit working to encourage a modern energy system of smaller-scale, efficient, renewable energy projects.

- Jesse Jenkins, Moderator:
MIT Energy Initiative Energy Fellow and Community Manager at The Energy Collective, former Director of Energy and Climate Policy at the Breakthrough Instituteenergiewende possible? Which nations have similar qualities?

What has been Germany's most successful strategy in cleaning up its energy mix?

Is the decision to eliminate nuclear power after the Fukushima event consistent with Germany's goals?

What could prevent other nations from adopting similar strategies?


  * https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1354509616397857280?source=tec_blast1&inf_contact_key=bb8ec0d2ea0a237eb8db11a840ff3a5b2b1aa31b33e32499f4be8f4cc0c4aaa2


Saturday, June 8, 2013

Decom SONGS Activist Press Conference



Anti-Nuclear Activists hold a press conference in response to Southern California Edison announcing plans to retire the San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant.

Rate payers have contributed over $3 BILLION to the San Onofre Decommission fund, That's what we call an "economic stimulus package" for workers of all sorts in the Sano vicinity.

1968-2013 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station RIP

The Former San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
The Former San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station RIP

Related articles

Monday, April 8, 2013

Why fatigue damage will stop the NRC from allowing Unit 2 to restart






FATIGUE DAMAGE TO SONGS STEAM GENERATORS
J. Hopenfeld 

Provided to the “DAB Safety Team” as additional explanation of the fatigue damage to SONGS steam generators which was discussed in a report by the author and was submitted to the California Public Utility Commission on March 29, 2013

Note: Links to these documents are listed below 

SCE/MHI made a mistake in their stress analysis, which directly impacts the safety of restarting Unit 2.  When the error is corrected, the result clearly shows that Unit 2 has already used up its allowed fatigue life and is not fit for service any longer.  This means that if Unit 2 is restarted at any power level an abrupt pressure change such as inadvertent closing or opening of a valve or a steam line break could lead to a sudden tube ruptures.   The ASME code and NRC regulations do not permit safety components to operate when their fatigue life has been exhausted.

The source of MHI’s error resulted from how they calculated the increase in the local stress at geometrical discontinuities  (notches), which are formed when two metal surfaces come in contact during vibration.  Since the worn surfaces of the tubes inside the steam generators cannot be seen, MHI made two key assumptions, which are inconsistent with the observation that both the tube and the supporting bar are worn into each other.  First, MHI assumed that the ASME endurance limit could be applied directly to the notched tube surfaces.  Since it is commonly known that surface roughness significantly reduces fatigue life and since the ASME data is for smooth polished surfaces, this assumption would underestimate the amount of fatigue damage.  Second, when using the Peterson chart, MHI assumed unrealistically large fillet radius and consequently derived a low concentration stress factor.  Large radii would decrease the local stress and cause the tube to fail at a higher stress thereby increasing its fatigue life.  Only by using these two, arbitrary non-conservative, assumptions was MHI able to conclude that Unit 2 did not suffer any fatigue damage.

As depicted in the MHI drawings the support bar and the tube form a sharp discontinuity at the contacting surface, therefore the appropriate geometry for calculating the stress concentration is an abrupt geometry change (very small radii), not a large radius shoulder fillet that was assumed by MHI.  When a correction is made to account for the sharp notch, the corrected stress indicates  (see Figure 1 below) that the tubes have used up their fatigue life during the first cycle of operation.  Structures with sharp notches can fail catastrophically when subjected to high cycle vibrations.  (MHI redacted their assumption so the exact value of the radius they used is unknown.)

 The loss of fatigue life is a major defect in the tube material; NRC regulations 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion 16 specify that for a licensee to maintain his operating license, such non-conformance must be promptly identified and corrected.   The licensee must assure that “corrective action (is) taken to preclude repetition.  NRC’s General Design Criteria 4 and 10CFR50 Appendix A also specify that steam generator tubes must be able to “ accommodate the effects of loss of coolant accidents “ The fact that the NRC has not already raised these issues in any of their  “Requests for Additional Information, RAIs” indicates that the NRC would be ignoring its own regulations if it allows SCE to restart Unit 2.

 In Summary: The SCE request for approval to operate Unit 2 at 70 % power for 150 days provided no explanation for the selection of this inspection interval.  The absence of such explanation and the absence of an indication of the actions that would follow demonstrate the unreliability of SCE entire assessment of restarting Unit 2.  Edison did not specify pass/fail criteria for the tubes during the outage inspection.  Given the fact that fatigue damage does not lend itself to detection, SCE request is unacceptable and should be rejected. 
  

Wednesday, April 3, 2013

NRC: The Good, The Bad and the Ugly


NRC: The Good, The Bad and the Ugly


... and why it is unsafe To restart San Onofre






A GOOD NRC enforcement example:

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station is a nuclear power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio. On March 5, 2002, maintenance workers discovered that corrosion had eaten a football-sized hole into the reactor vessel head of the Davis-Besse plant. Corrosion had been clogging the plant’s filters for months, requiring repeated filter replacement, but the cause was not investigated until after a worker leaned against a control rod drive mechanism, and it toppled over. Although the corrosion did not lead to an accident, this was considered to be a serious nuclear safety incident. Some observers have criticized the NRC’s Commission work as an example of regulatory capture [See Note 1] and the NRC has been accused of doing an inadequate job by the Union of Concerned Scientists.  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission kept Davis-Besse shut down until March 2004, so that FirstEnergy was able to perform all the necessary maintenance for safe operations. The NRC imposed its largest fine evermore than $5 million—against FirstEnergy for the actions that led to the corrosion. The company paid an additional $28 million in fines under a settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice. The NRC closely monitored FENOC’s response and concluded in September 2009 that FENOC met the conditions of the 2004 order. From 2004 through 2009 the NRC reviewed 20 independent assessments conducted at the plant and verified the independent assessors’ credentials. The agency also conducted its own inspections and reviewed FENOC’s reactor vessel inspections conducted in early 2005. NRC inspectors paid particular attention to the order’s focus on safety culture and safety conscious work environment to ensure there were no new signs of weakness. The NRC task force concluded that the corrosion, occurred for several reasons:

·    NRC, Davis-Besse and the nuclear industry failed to adequately review, assess, and follow up on relevant operating experience at other nuclear power plants;
·    Davis-Besse failed to ensure that plant safety issues received appropriate attention; and
·    NRC failed to integrate available information in assessing Davis-Besse’s safety performance.


A BAD NRC enforcement example:

At San Onofre by Region IV and the NRC: The papers shown below have been obtained from Public Domain written by Dr. Joram Hopenfeld and a former SONGS Employee based on his investigation of the steam generator issues, review of the plant data and discussions with several Key SONGS Insiders. These papers confirm that Southern California Edison wants to restart unsafe Unit 2 nuclear reactor at 70% power under false pretenses, just for profits, and as an unapproved risky experiment by subverting the NRC and Federal regulatory process.  The true Root Cause (See Note 2) of the unprecedented tube-to-tube wear in Unit 3 has NOT been officially established, as required by NRC Confirmatory Letter Action 1 for restarting the defectively designed and degraded Unit 2.  NRC has not even completed their review of Unit 2 Return to Service Reports, nor have they finished Special Unit 2 Tube Inspections, nor have they (publicly?) reviewed SCE’s Response to NRC’s Requests for Additional Information (RAIs).
NOTE: NO FINES ARE MENTIONED - WHY?


An UGLY NRC enforcement example?:

Now, SCE wants the NRC to approve a new shady License Amendment, undermining public safety and they want it done without the involvement of Public Safety Experts, Attorneys and/or Citizens/Ratepayers.  After the review of the Mitsubishi Root Cause Evaluation and the Draft SCE License Amendment, it is crystal clear that the NRC needs to follow the example of their own enforcement at David Besse together with the lessons learned from Fukushima, when it comes to NOT approving this new Shady License Amendment for restarting San Onofre Unit 2’s defectively designed and degraded replacement steam generators.  In light of the unanticipated/unprecedented tube leakage at San Onofre Unit 3, the health and safety, along with the economic concerns/objections of 8.4 million Southern Californians’ MUST OVERRIDE and PREVENT the restarting of Unit 2 at ANY power level.  In a Democratic Society, truth must prevail over profit motivations, misleading propaganda of electricity service disruption and/or projected probabilistic temporary inconveniences to the public based on phony data, because America cannot afford a trillion dollar nuclear eco-disaster!

Our Safety must override SCE's profits and prevent them from restarting Unit 2.

Notes:

1: Regulatory capture occurs when a regulatory agency, created to act in the public interest, instead advances the commercial or special concerns of interest groups that dominate the industry or sector it is charged with regulating.  Regulatory capture is a form of government failure, as it can act as an encouragement for firms to produce negative externalities. The agencies are called "captured agencies".

2. Human performance errors resulting from the negative safety culture of production (profits) goals overriding public safety obligations.


=======================================================================
Additional Information:

The full DAB Safety Team's Media Alert 5 Parts:
https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BweZ3c0aFXcFZGpvRlo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=1&docId=15V8BD4YK0MjwUV6gPZt6ILS_lP7CpClzgnZentLfx8U

The complete five (5) part presentation, see the eight (8) titles listed below:


Thursday, March 14, 2013

San Onofre Unit 2 Retainer Bars Could Cause Massive ☢ Leakage



In an accident like a main steam line break at San Onofre, the badly designed retainers bars in Unit 2 could actually make things much worse by causing more damage to any of the 9,727 already fatigued tubes in each of its steam generators which could lead to additional leakage of highly radioactive reactor core coolant and/or cause a nuclear incident or worse a nuclear accident like Fukushima!


Radioactive Leaks and ruptures can happen without notice:





Allegation/Violations

The NRC has decided in AIT follow-up report dated 11/09/2012, “Item 3. “(Closed) Unresolved Item 05000362/2012007-03, ‘Evaluation of Retainer Bars Vibration during the Original Design of the Replacement Steam Generators” as a non-cited violation in accordance with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC’s Enforcement Policy.”  However, as shown below, SCE/MHI’s failure to verify the adequacy of the retainer bar design as required by SCE/MHI’s procedures have resulted in plugging of several hundred tubes in the brand new replacement generators. This has resulted in these violations:

1. Failure to meet NRC Chairman Standards on Nuclear Safety by SCE,
2. Failure to meet Senator Boxer’s Committee on Environment and Public Works
(EPW) Standards on Nuclear Safety by SCE,
3. Failure to enforce SCE Edison Contract Document instructions to MHI by SCE,
4. Failure to meet SONGS Technical Specifications by SCE,
5. Failure to meet general design criteria (GDC) in Appendix A, “General Design
Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” to 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic
Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities GDC 14, “Reactor
Coolant Pressure Boundary” by SCE/MHI,
6. Failure to demonstrate that Unit 2 retainer bars will maintain tube bundle
geometry at 70% power due to fluid elastic instability during a main line
steam break (MSLB) design basis event, and
7. SCE/MHI took shortcuts by avoiding the 10 CFR 50.90 License Amendment
Process under the false pretense of “like for a like” replacement steam
generator.  SCE added 377 more tubes, increased the average length of the
heated tubes and changed the thermal-hydraulic operation of the RSGs without
proper safety analysis and inadequate 10CFR 50.59 Evaluation.
This intentional action to produce more thermal megawatts out of the
RSGs compromised safety at SONGS Unit 2 due to the failure of 90
percent through wall thickness of a tube by the inadequate design of the
r
etainer bar.

Recommended Actions:

NRC San Onofre Special Panel is requested to resolve the above listed Allegations and/or Violations within 30 days of receipt of this email and prior to granting SCE’s permission to do any restart "testing" of Unit 2. Answer all allegations factually, don't just void them.
 
See Full Document:
Media Alert: San Onofre Retainer Bar Problems

Saturday, March 2, 2013

San Diego screening of MOVIE: "311: Surviving Japan"


WE HAVE THIS weekend to pre-sell just 6 seats to make this screening happen in San Diego! No excuses on the weekend, just DO it: You will NOT be charged until the event is confirmed. ($12 per ticket)http://www.tugg.com/titles/311-surviving-japan?location=global&state=upcoming
Please join us for the 2nd Anniversary of the Fukushima nuclear disaaster!

San Diego screening of "311: Surviving Japan" on Monday, March 11, 2013, the 2nd Anniversary of the Fukushima nuclear disaster (7:30p). PLEASE RESERVE YOUR TICKET(S) ONLINE ASAP TO ENSURE THE FILM IS SCREENED HERE: http://www.tugg.com/titles/311-surviving-japan?location=global&state=upcoming You will NOT be charged until the event is confirmed. ($12 per ticket).  We must sell 50 tickets in advance ASAP for this film to be a go at the theater!

Where:
7037 Friars Rd, San Diego, California 92108

YOU MUST RESERVE YOUR SEAT ONLINE NOW!  There will be no "walk up" tickets sold.

We will do a "Light Brigade" action along the busy Friars Road entrance to the Fashion Valley Mall from 6-7p, holding lighted letter signs spelling out "No More Fukushimas". Please emailmarthasullivan@mac.com to volunteer as a "Holder of the Light."

We will also do Flyering inside the Mall during the same period before the screening: 6-7p, with a special guest for the occasion. Please email marthasullivan@mac.com to volunteer for the Info Crew.

Here is a brief description of the film: "Inside story of 2011 Japanese Tsunami relief & Fukushima nuclear disaster. A critical look at how the authorities handled the nuclear crisis and Tsunami relief by an American who volunteered in the clean-up. It is in short, a documentary of the devastating events in Japan and 6 months of the after-math that followed. It features true stories from those affected by the disaster, the government and even TEPCO. It highlights the struggle in dealing with: The Tsunami clean-up, Government response to the disaster, radiation plus the future of nuclear power after the accident." (90 minutes long, plus speaker.)

Tuesday, February 12, 2013

San Onofre Legacy (SOL Part 1, 2 and 3)


The DAB Safety Team released three Media Alerts today!


Together they describe (in technical detail) the current situation at San Onofre, along with what SCE, their experts and other public nuclear watchdogs are now saying about all the NRC RESTART QUESTIONS they have been told to answer:


snip:
The following paper shows that the entire NRC Regulatory Process is underfunded, broken and needs additional funding, oversight and extensive overhaul to ensure public safety.

snip:
The presentation by SCE, Mitsubishi and other experts to the NRC was very disappointing and disturbing to 8.4 million Southern Californians.  The presentation did not address U.S. Sen. Barbara Boxer and Congressman Edward J. Markey’s concerns expressed on February 6, 2013 in her letter to NRC Chairman McFarlane, “Southern California Edison was aware of problems with replacement steam generators at its San Onofre nuclear power plant but chose not to make fixes.

snip:
The structural integrity of SONGS degraded retainer bar system to withstand combined loads that result from postulated accident conditions events has not been demonstrated.