The Unsatisfactory Status Of The NRC Region IV Augmented Inspection Team Report Which Contains TEN Unresolved Items, Requires Additional NRR Investigation And Resolution.
The DAB Safety Team has transmitted the following to the Chairman of the NRC, Offices of Nuclear Regulator Regulations (NRR), Atomic Safety Licensing Board and NRC AIT Chief.
The NRC AIT Report (ADAMS Accession Number ML2012007) identified ten unresolved items in July 2012 that warranted additional follow-up:
- Adequacy of the post trip/transient procedure;
- Evaluation and disposition of the Unit 3 loose parts monitor alarms;
- Design of retainer bar;
- Control of original design dimensions;
- Evaluation of and controls for divider plate repair;
- Atmospheric controls of Unit 3 steam generators during shipment;
- No tube bundle support used during shipping;
- Evaluation and disposition of accelerometer readings during shipping;
- Adequacy of Mitsubishi’s thermal-hydraulic model;
- Change of methodologies associated with 10 CFR 50.59 review.
DAB SAFETY Team Comments. re: NRC AIT Report : It has been almost six months since the issuance of the original report and since that time the NRC AIT Team has completed several follow-up inspections at SONGS. However, the NRC AIT Team has not publically updated its report on the results of follow-up inspections to resolve the above items and determination of violations of regulatory requirements by SCE. These concerns were expressed to the NRC Region IV Staff and AIT Team at the November 30, 2012 Public Meeting. Several Environmental, Public and even Pro-Nuclear Groups have repeatedly and publicly stated to the NRC, Atomic Licensing Board and Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations (NRR): “When it comes to SCE’s mistakes and public policy, NRC Region IV is asleep at the wheel.” The NRC Chairman has stressed the need for “Independent Regulators” during her recent Fukushima trip. Therefore, these items should be added to the NRR list for resolution. Especially, items (2), (3), (9) and (10) should be resolved as soon as possible. In addition, the NRR should made public SCE’s FSAR analysis showing the effect of a Main Steam Line Break for Unit 2 operation up to Reactor Thermal Power on Steam Generator Tube Ruptures (for one (1), four (4), eight (8) or an ever increasing number (a cascade aka Hopenfeld Effect) of tube rupture/failures) in accordance with President Barack Obama, Senator Barbara Boxer and the NRC Chairman’s Open Government Initiative, as these documents directly affect public safety, they must no longer be considered SCE’s “privileged documents” after their SONGS Replacement Generators $680 Million Debacle.
Please see the DAB Safety Team’s Press Release + 12-12-28 Thirty Alarms Demonstrates SONGS Unsafe for details item (2).
This press release will be posted on the web at this link: DAB Safety Team Documents.
The DAB Safety Team: Don, Ace and a BATTERY of safety-conscious San Onofre insiders plus industry experts from around the world who wish to remain anonymous. These volunteers assist the DAB Safety Team by sharing knowledge, opinions and insight but are not responsible for the contents of the DAB Safety Team's reports. We continue to work together as a Safety Team to prepare additional : DAB Safety Team Documents, which explain in detail why a SONGS restart is unsafe at any power level without a Full/Thorough/Transparent NRC 50.90 License Amendment and Evidentiary Public Hearings. For more information from The DAB Safety Team, please visit the link above.
Our Mission: To prevent a Trillion Dollar Eco-Disaster like Fukushima, from happening in the USA.
The DAB Safety Team: January 10, 2013
Media Contact: Don Leichtling (619) 296-9928 or Ace Hoffman (760) 720-7261
Copyright January 2, 2013 by The DAB Safety Team. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast or redistributed without crediting the DAB Safety Team. The contents cannot be altered without the Written Permission of the DAB Safety Team Leader and/or the DAB Safety Team’s Attorney
Post a Comment
Thank you for your comment!