Monday, November 19, 2012

So Cal Edison In Violation And Cannot Be Allowed To Restart San Onofre Unit 2

SCE is now in Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 14, 15, 30 and 32 Requirements... And cannot be allowed to restart Unit 2 at ANY power level!

Decommission San Onofre
Decommission San Onofre
SONGS is required to inspect its steam generators (SG’s) and repair or remove from use any tubes found to contain flaws exceeding 35% of the nominal tube wall thickness.  SCE was operating SONGS Unit 3 RSG E-088 for 11 months with eight tubes with flaws ranging from 72-100% in violation of the above law.  Now SCE wants to jeopardize the safety of 8.4 Million Southern Californians by restarting their degraded Unit 2 RSGs with 2 flawed tubes exceeding 28% of their nominal tube wall thickness along with thousands of other fatigue damaged tubes that may have undetected, untested, undiscovered, unmeasured, undocumented and or un-quantified cracks and run it for 5 months!

SCE is desperately trying to justify the restart of Unit 2 based on conflicting, confusing and erroneous Operational Assessments prepared by Westinghouse, AREVA, Intertek and MHI with Inscrutable (Undecipherable) Data and under-conservative computer models, which are not applicable to 100% Steam Voiding caused by a Main Steam Line Break and sub-cooled feed water flashing conditions due to Steam generator depressurization.   The nominal tube wall thickness “flaw” of 28% of these tubes is projected to be > 31% during the 5 month trial restart of Unit 2 based on untested data, that may be applicable to other plants, but not to SONGS.  Based on the history of the catastrophic and unprecedented failure of eight Unit 3 SG E-088 tubes, Unit 2 SG design deficiencies and incomplete tube inspections, these flaws can exceed the 35% plugging limit at any time prior to the end of 5 months trial period due to any abnormal plant operations or transients [e.g., loss of offsite power, adverse local thermal-hydraulic conditions (like high Steam voids of > 99.6% due to narrow tube pitch to tube diameter ratio, low tube clearances), etc.], all of which are beyond the control of the operator.  Hence, the Public and the Regulators will never know, until it is too late, when Unit 2 again will be operating in violation of the Technical Specifications Limit.  Unit 2’s Restart Effort is just an unapproved and desperate experiment, which is not permitted by law.  The only legal option SCE has is to apply for a thorough NRC 10 CFR 50.90 License Amendment, along with transparent and trial-like public hearings.  Anything less, would be a regulatory failure by the NRC, to protect public safety and a violation of the authority and the privileges granted by the President and Congress of the United States.


 Read the complete Press Release + 12-11-19 

à For additional technical information read The DAB Safety Team’s: SONGS MSLB Analysis

1 comment:

  1. Here is the latest data on not only why SONGS cannot be allowed to be restarted at any power level, but why the NRC must stop living in denial and accept the fact that cascading multiple SG tube failures can happen at any time, which can easily lead to a major loss of reactor coolant (Think Fukushima) and or large radioactive releases.

    Because of the SG eight tubes that failed in-situ testing at SONGS, basic SG safety now requires that every SG tube in the US fleet needs to be inspected using advanced technology ASAP, before we have one or more nuclear incidents/accidents which our Country can ill afford! I urge you to pass this information along to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel because it is applicable to the safety of all US Steam Generators.

    I trust the NRC will fully appreciate the work that went into the 42 page SONGS MSLB Analysis technical version listed above.


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